

er
ch
ng
n-
n;
he
er
l.
is
of
e
i-
it
t
t

To

6
OIL WITHOUT VINEGAR,

AND

DIGNITY WITHOUT PRIDE :

OR,

BRITISH, AMERICAN,

AND

WEST-INDIA INTERESTS

CONSIDERED.

—
THE SECOND EDITION.
WITH A PREFACE, AND ADDITIONS.
—

Together with a CHART, showing the Rise and Fall of the
Trade between the two Countries.

—
BY MACALL MEDFORD, ESQ.
—

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR W. J. AND J. RICHARDSON, CORNHILL; J.
HARDING, ST. JAMES'S STREET; AND THOMAS
DODSON, PHILADELPHIA.

1807.

6

WILLIAM WILKINSON

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

THE SECOND PART

W. Flint, Printer,
Old Bailey.

the w
the e
other
great
to its
politi
ing a
differe
part

“ The title of Mr. Medford's pamphlet is by much the worst thing we have found in it. The saying about the effects of an ill name, applies to books as well as other objects; and we fear, that this tract will suffer greatly from a circumstance almost wholly irrelevant to its merits. It is in truth one of the most sensible political essays that have lately appeared, far exceeding any other which has been produced by the present differences, in the rare qualities of candour and impartiality.—*Edinburgh Review for October 1807.*”

The first of the three is the "The
 second is the "The
 third is the "The

W. H.
I did
so much
have

I a
anim
cond
with

M
in q
the

PREFACE

TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

WHEN this short Pamphlet first appeared, I did not expect that it would give rise to so much discussion and animadversion as have already taken place with regard to it.

I am, in consequence of some of those animadversions, induced on offering a Second Edition to the public; to preface with a few observations.

My claim to impartiality has been called in question:—the title, the arrangement, the want of a concluding chapter, and

above all, my Strictures on the West India Evidence, given before a Committee of the House of Commons, have given offence; and lastly, it has been observed, that I did not begin by stating in a sufficiently distinct manner, the nature of the differences between Great Britain and the United States of America.

As I am not tenacious of defending my own mode of writing, and as my intention and wish is to be understood, and to throw light on the important subject on which I have addressed the public, I have attended to those remarks; but at the same time I hope I may be permitted, and I feel it due to myself, to give my reasons for the manner and form in which my small work first appeared.

My claim to impartiality is precisely what I have represented it to be: ties of friendship and connection with both countries, and a conscious feeling of a wish to be of service to both. To those who say that such conduct is like serving two mas-

the West India
committee of the
given offence;
ved, that I did
sufficiently dis-
the differences
and the United

defending my
s my intention
, and to throw
ect on which I
I have attend-
the same time
, and I feel it
reasons for the
my small work

ty is precisely
to be: ties of
ith both coun-
g of a wish to
those who say
rving two mas-

ters, I answer, that if a desire to be im-
partial deserves such an appellation, the
world has hitherto been much mistaken;
but to my way of thinking, the world has
not been mistaken. I know that many
difficulties are in the way of true impartial-
ity; perhaps I have not a mind sufficient-
ly enlarged to be so; but the thing is
in itself so estimable, that I feel some con-
solation in an ardent desire to treat the
subject in a fair unbiassed way.

The person who has with so little cere-
mony accused me of serving two masters,
has shewn his ignorance of one of the first
and most essential of moral principles.—
In what does the innate idea of justice
originate—but a love of impartiality?—By
what means is justice administered, if not
by an exercise of the power of the mind to
divest itself of partiality?

If interest, passion, and prejudice, pre-
vail in every breast, justice must quit this
world; and the man who advances that
doctrine, ought not to address the public;

what right has he to claim attention, if interest, passion, and prejudice, predominate in every breast; if justice and impartiality are mere words of pretence, the man who says so, can scarcely expect much credit for what he himself may advance?

As to the title, I own that it is quaint, but will any one say that it is not applicable and significant? and I believe it has had a considerable effect in first drawing public attention to the work.

The use and intention of a title to any work, I understand to be, to indicate the nature of its contents, and attract attention; and if that is done in a way that is neither indecorous nor improper, I know not what more can be desired: as I have not been mistaken in my title, and it has answered the purpose, I must expect to meet with the language of vexation.

The West India merchants, some of whose friends do not like my arguments, make up for the mortification of not being

able to answer them, by applying to me harsh epithets, and saying I have been careless, and not investigated their statements: whether or not, they will congratulate themselves on the result of my farther attention to their statements, the reader will be able to judge when he has looked over my addition to the work.*

I have remedied the want of a concluding chapter, as I think it the duty of every writer to save his reader trouble as much as is in his power.

* Those who cavil against me, have gone so far as to advert to my account of the affair of Jenkins's ears.—I should not advert to this, were it not that the inference intended is, that I am inaccurate, and inattentive to truth.—Tale I would not wish to be in any case.

As to Capt. Jenkins's ears, the matter originated in a party trick, the truth therefore is not generally known, for it was concealed with care, as all artifices are:—Voltaire says, they lost his ears, and slit his nose: Smollet says, they cut off only one ear. Mr. Pulteney declared in Parliament, that the very name of Jenkins would raise a regiment of Volunteers.

"The Spaniards say they did a waggish thing."

"Who cropped our ears and sent them to the King." Poet.

I am not to be accused of any disregard for truth, because I do not give the same account with any one person.—I say, from authority, I give credit to, that the ears were not cut off, but that it was a device of the war party to inflame the nation.

As to those who think I should have begun with stating the cause of difference between Britain and America, I supposed that every person was sufficiently acquainted with that, but as it does not appear so, I will explain:

The Americans claim the right of naturalizing British subjects after a certain residence in their country, and refuse to give them up to British officers when demanded. — The language of the two countries being the same, and difficulties occurring, have led to a misunderstanding on the subject, so that it has become necessary to settle the point and lay it asleep, in such a way as not again to endanger the peace of the two countries.

The constant capture of American ships, under some one of the orders of the British council, and in one word, an ill defined and ill understood naval code, not only with respect to the right of trading with the colonies of a country at war, but the rights of neutrals in general, has led to much

discontent in both countries, so that there is a necessity of settling the business either by arms or arrangement.

Before America was separated from Britain, an act was passed naturalizing strangers after a certain time of residence there.—The States, therefore, can scarcely have that contested now by the British government; but suspicion and misunderstanding, relative to the truth or falsity of letters of naturalisation, have been constantly taking place; and as the whole commerce of the world has nearly fallen into the hands of the British and Americans, since the French revolution, they are rivals, and jealous of each other.

While matters are so situated, Britain has colonies contiguous to America, and dependant on her for the supply of the most necessary articles, at the same time that the Americans are not allowed to carry away in return the most advantageous articles of produce from the islands. All these circumstances form a very intri-

cate case, and a great number of grounds for quarrel naturally arise out of it.

While such are the general circumstances, a number of individuals have endeavoured to augment the animosities by exaggerated statements.

I certainly need not relate the circumstances of the recent affair between the Leopard and Chesapeake, which led to the immediate discussions. I have stated the general situation of the two countries, and my view is to discuss the business as a matter of right, of expediency and practicability, keeping always in view the advantage of an amicable arrangement.

I have now, as far as I can, removed the objections that were made to the first edition, except with regard to the recapitulation which will be found at the end, and to which I refer for my farther remarks on the evidence of the West India merchants; as well as for a plan I have suggested, by which British born subjects will

be unable to procure false papers of naturalization in America, and when furnished with true ones, will be no longer subject to suspicion, thereby removing one of the great causes of misunderstanding between the two countries.

One of the consequences of my attention to this subject, and my endeavour to view it in every different way, is that I have made up my mind completely as to the possibility of England and America arranging their differences in an amicable manner, if they will consult their interests, and not listen to the representation of interested individuals. I am even of the opinion that they cannot avoid seeing peace as their mutual interests, if the circumstances are attended to in a cool manner, as I have not the smallest doubt that it will be.

London, November 13, 1807.

CONTENTS.

Preface.....	iii
--------------	-----

CHAP. I.

The Necessity of discussing the Question on a liberal Plan—Greatness of the object—Circumstances now —Each Party should view the Case in a general way, not regarding only particular and near interests.....	1
--	---

CHAP. II.

Three Questions discussed—Citizenship, Navigation, Laws, and Colonial Trade; and Observations upon the Increase of the Trade of Great Britain.....	7
--	---

CHAP. III.

The Mis-statement of the Report on the Subject, and Observations on the Report of the West India Committee.....	20
---	----

CHAP. IV.

Great Increase of the Trade of England with America, with the West Indies, since the French Revolution, and the Nature of the West India Trade ex- plained.....	27
--	----

CHAP. V.

Advantages and disadvantages to America in case of a
War with England—Advantages and disadvantages
to England.....57

CHAP. VI.

General Discussions—Observations—Proposals in con-
sequence of the foregoing Enquiry.....79

CHAP. VII.

Recapitulation, containing farther Observations on the
Evidence of the West India Merchants, and a Plan
to obviate the Difficulties relative to Letters of
Maritime.....89

WITH

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

An Account of the Quantity of Provisions and Lumber im-
ported into the British West India Islands, from the
United States, and from British American Colonies,
shewing the Proportion from each.

An Account of the total Exports from the West Indies,
shewing the Proportion to the United States, British
American Colonies, and to Great Britain.

An Account, shewing the total Exports from Great Britain to the West Indies.

An Account, shewing the Amount of Cotton imported from the West Indies, the total Amount consumed, and the Countries from where it is received.

An Account, shewing the gradual Rise of the Exports of the United States, and the Particulars of the Amount from each State.

Observations on the Complaints of West India Ship Owners.

A comparative View of the Financial and Commercial Situation of Great Britain, and the United States of America, &c. &c. &c.

PAGE.

in case of a
disadvantage
.....87

proposals in con-
.....78

ervations on the
a, and a Plan
to Letters of
.....89

X.

ons and Lumber hu-
ia Islands, from the
American Colonies,

in the West Indies;
ited States, British
tain.

EXPLANATION OF THE CHART.

The Chart of Trade between the British Islands and the United States, is done upon a plan that I have long approved for its clearness, and the facility with which the general outline of the business is comprehended.*

Except during one year, the balance is greatly in favour of Britain; but that balance is not paid in money, but in American produce sent to the continent of Europe, the value of which is paid to England. This Chart shows the direct trade between the two countries, on both sides, quite accurately, and serves to demonstrate the importance of the connection. And it is clear, that if AMERICA CANNOT EXPORT TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, SHE CANNOT PAY HER BALANCE TO ENGLAND, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THAT TRADE MUST CEASE.


* These Charts first introduced by Mr. Playfair, afterwards by Mr. Cury, since copied in France.

PART.

lands and the
are long ap-
which the ge-



ly in favour
money; but in
Europe, the
art shows the
sides, quite
stance of the
CANNOT EL-
NOT PAY HER
MENTLY THAT

erwards by Mr.



The Divisions at bottom are Years that

CHART
 of
Exports and Imports
 To and from
United States of America
 to the present time
 1851
WILL MEDFORD.
 London Nov. 15. 1867.



are Years those on the side Money

No
 P
 str
 the
 yet
 a r
 me
 am
 in
 pos
 and
 any
 call
 of
 ob
 the



OIL WITHOUT VINEGAR, &c.

CHAP. I.

*Necessity of discussing the question on a liberal plan.
—Greatness of the object—Circumstances new—Each
party should view the case in a general way, not re-
garding only particular and near interests.*

PERHAPS no two countries were ever better situated for making each other rich and happy than England and the United States of America; yet by some strange fatality they are on the eve of a rupture, attended with circumstances of acrimony that seldom accompany hostilities even amongst nations most opposite in character and in interest.—Why is all this so? That is an important question.—How can the case be altered and animosities diminished? This is a more important question still, to which I propose to call the attention of the public of both countries, after first adverting to the existing circumstances, observing that those who have written on both sides of the question, have by their variety of op-

posite representations rendered the subject so confused, as to make it difficult to form an opinion as to what is wise or just: immediate views and immediate interests seem to be the guide of those in whose hands is placed the destiny of mankind.

What is wise and advantageous to be done? What is it found equitable to do? and what is practicable? these are the great questions on every important occasion. When people are too much biassed by interest or inflamed by passion, they are incapable of making the enquiry, and when reason loses its effect an appeal is made to what the ancient Germans emphatically termed "the Right of the Fist;" but let us hope that on the present occasion two free and enlightened nations may settle their differences in a wiser way.

Enough of blood, enough of slaughter's past,
And Albion's sons shall have repose at last.

Those writers who have with such labour and pains cited authorities, ancient and modern, for and against the Rights of Neutrals have been of little service to the cause—An appeal to the law of nations is not much better, but the law of nature scarcely ever will be appealed to in vain.

As to authorities, the present circumstances are so new, that the cases that have occurred do not now apply; and with regard to the law of nations I must be indulged in one observation.

So long as a convention that is entered into tends to the mutual or ultimate advantage of the parties, they may all join cordially in the measure, but the instant that the majority find a regulation injurious to them, however just it may be, they will endeavour to get rid of it; and on the other hand an unjust regulation, if advantageous to the stronger party, assumes the appearance of law and right.

Much has been said about the regulations adopted about fifty years ago, but at that time the trade of Europe was pretty equally divided, so were colonies and settlements both in the East and West Indies—America did not then exist as a nation. Now the case is quite altered; the trade of Europe, and the territories in the East and West Indies, are chiefly monopolized by Britain; so that the regulations that agreed with the general interest during the seven years war, are not now equally beneficial to all nations; the consequence of this is, that the regulations are invoked by Britain, and exclaimed against by all other nations; to enter into arguments on that subject, will scarcely therefore be of any great utility. —Interest is too much concerned in the business, for justice to be taken as the guide. We must, then inquire into practicability, endeavouring, however, to be ruled by justice as much as possible, for, when that is neglected, new quarrels are the certain consequence.

Having lived for nearly as long a period in England, as I did in America, (my native country) I feel a great attachment to both nations. I think I feel a tolerable degree of impartiality, and I confess I am very desirous of preventing hostilities between two nations that may be so much benefited by peace, and that certainly will be so much injured by war. But before I enter into particulars, I shall just state the consequences as they appear to be to me to each country.

America is a new and rising country, its progress, which is unprecedentedly rapid, may be retarded, but it cannot be stopped; therefore, whatever bad consequences may result, they will be but momentary. It is not so with Britain which is a country already risen so high, that the question is not to rise higher, but to remain as it is. Should hostilities with America prove seriously injurious to England, they may never be remedied; thus the case is of much more importance to Britain, than it is to America. I mean not to say that America may not suffer most severely in the first instance, but the consequences can only be momentary; whereas, with respect to Britain, they may be such as never to be done away.

CHAP. II.

Three Questions discussed—Citizenship, Navigation, Laws and Colonial Trade, and Observations upon the Increase of the Trade of Great-Britain.

THE three great questions to be discussed, are Citizenship, Colonial Laws, and General Navigation Law, or the Rights of Neutrals.

First, As to their importance, we shall find that it is greatly exaggerated, but particularly that of Citizenship. Certainly no act of one country can free a man from his allegiance to his Sovereign, but then it is to be considered "what that allegiance?" Allegiance in respect to obeying the laws is local as much as the payment of taxes, for a British subject does neither when he leaves his country, but while he remains in it he must do both. Not to carry arms against his Sovereign is the only *fragment of allegiance* that may be said to follow a man into another country, so that the question of Citizenship is very easily determined.

No law prevents a man from leaving his country; and when a man enters into a new country, that country may naturalize him. If peace remains between the two nations, here the matter is

at an end ; but if the person so emigrating enters into an army to fight against his original Sovereign, if taken, he is liable to be treated as a rebel ; but there is no right to demand him. The rights of the former Sovereign only return when his subject comes under his dominion*.

If then there is no right to demand back British subjects who have emigrated, it may be added, as a still more important argument, that even if the matter of right were different, what would be the matter of policy ? England certainly has not conceived the mad project of keeping people from leaving it by force ; but, if so, as few do emigrate, preventing them would not be attended with much advantage to the country, and if the number is but small, whatever the right may be, it is bad policy to engage in a war that may be very serious, to obtain so small an advantage. As to the dignity of protecting rights, and the disgrace of yielding a point, and submitting to an injury, that may, in this case, be entirely done away by an arrangement entered into in a voluntary manner ; proceeding upon the principle that allegiance is local, and ceases with removal, for when a man ceases to be with a society, he ceases to derive any

* There is a law to prevent artists from being carried out of the kingdom, which so far infringes on the Bill of Rights, as it separates one portion of society from the other, without any other reasons than what are founded on policy.

benefit from its laws, and is no longer any of its members.

I know it may be said that the case of seamen is different from that of other men,* but whatever the point may be as to right, it is nothing as to importance.

Were it agreed that such men were to be given up, of what value would such an obligation be? The parade of the deserters at Norfolk would not indeed have taken place, but the men would have gone up the country privately. The injury would have been the same, though then there would have been no insult. As the matter stands, the parading of the seamen seems to have been intended to produce some disturbance; but let this business end as it may, when English sailors wish to join Americans, and when they have an opportunity to do it, the execution of their purpose will never be prevented by any law that can be made to the contrary.

So much then for the small interest England has as a nation in the affair of citizenship. Let us now proceed to examine into the laws respecting her colonial trade.

The colonial laws must in all cases depend on circumstances, not on what people apprehend

* As by the law of the land, a journeyman must not leave his master in the middle of a job. This is a deprivation of liberty, arising from an act of the man himself who undertook to do the work.

to be rights, in the jargon of the day, called *the legal rights of the mother country*, one of which is stated upon the general scale to be a monopoly of the trade of the colony. Now with the greatest deference to those high authorities who entertain a different opinion, I will maintain that the mother country has not an unlimited right to monopolize the trade of a colony.

If such unlimited right existed the mother country might starve a colony for want of provisions, and yet do so without injustice; a thing contrary to the immutable law of God, as well as to those laws of man, which being implanted in the nature of things, do not admit of change.

If then the mother country has not an unlimited right it must be a limited one, it is like the right of a parent over a child, to correct, but not to maim, strangle, or destroy. A father cannot be punished for an assault, though he may have administered correction to a child, that had it not been his own would have made him liable to very high damages. In this case the law between the parent and child is different from that between other individuals, or from common law, but if the parent starves or murders his child, the punishment is the same as if it were the child of another person. In this case the law between the parent and child is the same as between any other persons.

Thus it is with colonies in certain cases, and

to a certain extent the mother country has a right to regulate the trade of a colony, but in others it has not; it is therefore a limited authority, like that of a parent.

This point being once established, no question is to be decided but upon the footing of reciprocal interest or particular circumstances, which must determine whether it is without or within the limits.

We then have to enquire whether the subjects in dispute are without or within the limit that bounds the right of the mother country. It is from that, and that only the case of the right can be established.

To have free liberty to exchange produce for produce is the chief part of what is wished by the inhabitants of the islands and by the Americans, and this certainly it is not within the power or authority of the mother country to prevent for, as the mother country cannot rob or starve the colony, so likewise it has no right to prevent it from trafficking to the best advantage, and selling its produce as it pleases, only obtaining a preference for itself upon equal conditions.

The mother country has the right of laying on duties, governing and legislating, but surely can have no right to prevent a man who grows sugar on his estate from exchanging it for wheat, as he cannot always be sucking sugar, and must have bread; neither has it a right to oblige him to

send all his sugar to a London merchant, which he sells (by a candle's end) for an old song, in return sending over, at an enormous price, dresses for slaves, and the other European articles wanted in a plantation.

If this point were granted, perhaps the dispute would be at an end; for though there are other objects, they are of minor consequence; but as in other cases, we have taken into consideration the importance of the object demanded, as well as the justice of the demand, let us do so in the present instance.

If Government would place the English West India islands and settlements under a just, but liberal regulation, the Planters would be happy, the islands would become rich, and all the differences with America would be at an end without altering her navigation laws, and West India estates would be doubled in value in a few years.

Government must know the amount of revenue, it receives duty on West India produce. If every planter in the West Indies was obliged to take out a licence, or (in any other way more agreeable to himself) to pay a duty in the West Indies upon the produce raised, so as to bring in the same revenue to Government as at present, it would give him an opportunity of selling or exchanging produce in the island, or sending it to England if he found it his interest, which would break a combination

in London, that is now labouring to bring about a war with America, and risking the separation of the West India Islands, from the mother country, merely because the Americans are carrying on a considerable trade in West India produce, which they do not send to the West India merchants in London to sell, in order to avoid ruinous charges.

Was there ever any thing more contrary to fairness and common sense, than that a Planter in the West Indies, who has sugar, and wants bread, meat, and the other necessaries of life for himself and negroes, should not have a right of exchanging his sugar for them. He must be obliged to send it to a London West India merchant to sell, in order to raise the money to pay for bread, &c. by drawing on the merchant, at a loss, who sells the sugar perhaps for half the price the poor Planter could have got in the West Indies?

Any person wishing to see a curious official document on the subject of the West Indies, will do well to read the Report of the Committee on the Trade to the West India Colonies. I find in it the examination of a Mr. Henry Shirely, who I conclude is a West India Planter; he appears to know what arrangements would benefit the West Indies, and add to the happiness of individuals. There seems to be so much candour and good sense.

in his answers, that I will annex part of his examination:

Question—Would the British Planter, in your opinion, be relieved to any, and what extent, by being permitted to barter certain proportions of their coffee and sugar in payment for American supplies equivalent to the cargoes imported?

Answer—They certainly would. The Americans would take some of our worst sugars; it would greatly reduce the exportation of money, and prevent the ruinous consequences of giving bills of exchange, which, in these calamitous times are often dishonoured.

Question—Would the British Planter's market for rum be injured by a monopoly of their supply being granted to the British North American Colonies?

Answer—It would make the Planter still more dependant on the British merchants, who cannot be very indulgent in such times as these. They seem to pity our case, but they add to our miseries by always deriving a profit from our distresses.

After going through a pamphlet on the subject of the West India commerce, on the last page, (160) I find information which appears to be given with so much correctness, that I have

taken the liberty of annexing a copy of it.* The paper to which I refer is a London West India merchant's account of sales of ten hhds. of sugar; I regret that the time the sugar were shipped is not mentioned, that I might have made a statement to show if the poor Planter had been permitted to exchange the sugar for beef, how many barrels it would have produced, and how many poor negroes that beef would have fed. When I look at the account of sales, and consider similar ones every packet carries to the West Indies, and when I see that the fruits of the labourer, which were intended to cherish the hearts of the poor Planters, have gone into the pockets of men enjoying all the luxuries in the world, I cannot withhold exclaiming—Oh! Providence, how much longer will you permit your intentions to be so perverted?—Well may the Planters be poor, and poor they will remain until they get rid of the blood-suckers who are drawing their existence from them. The Planter's situation at present is worse than that of the negro slaves they purchase from Africa; the latter is expected to work only with his hands, and for a certain number of hours each day, but the former is obliged to work body and mind, night and day, for his London masters, without giving satisfaction. His situation is but little different from poor

* See Appendix, No. 1.

Mungo, except that his skin is not black, when he says,

" Dear heart, what a terrible life am I led !
A dog has a better that's shelter'd and fed.
Night and day 'tis the same,
My pain is dere game :
Me wish to de Lord me was dead !

The Americans already deal to a very large amount with the English West Indies * for rum, and they sell much more than they are allowed to return ; but if they were not shackled they would take the return in sugar instead of money, and every one would be gainer by this except the London merchant, his broker and auctioneer. In the first place the merchants' consignments would be diminished ; in the next place the Planter being more at his ease, would not depend upon him, as he now generally does. The broker, auctioneer, and merchant, (that respectable trio,) are then the persons for whom the negroes sweat, their masters run in debt, and we are to go to war. Let us consider this a little.

" Softly, softly, says a Custom-house officer, " his Majesty's revenues will be injured." I have no objection to giving softly that I may go surely, but I will maintain that it would not injure the revenue.

The same quantity of sugars being raised, they could still be subjected to the same duties,

* See Appendix, No. 2.

but raised in another way, for we are not to give up the right of taxing the commodity so as to make up to the revenue what it already pays.

It is not altogether the money paid; but, in a great degree, the manner of paying, that is the grievance, and this would form a proper subject for inquiry and regulation.

The sugars and other produce would then cost much less than at present in the first instance; and, therefore, even those things which I have stated as losses, would be, in a great degree, counter-balanced.

Shall I add to all this that the natural disposition of the islands to coalesce with America, against Britain, would be diminished, and by that means an event that must some day take place, would be removed to a greater distance.

On the whole the loss to Britain would be little, perhaps nothing, the advantages would possibly be considerable: but, at all events, this would be an absurd cause of a war, the first consequences of which, as will be seen hereafter, would be to starve the West India Islands.

I next come to the most important of all the questions, including the whole of the navigation laws as now interpreted, on the one part and on the other.

When all the powers of Europe had a pretty equal share of trade, as was the case till the beginning of the French Revolution, as the regu-

lations were mutually advantageous and disadvantageous, it was not of very great importance what those regulations were. But now that England alone of the Belligerents, has ships, colonies and commerce, the justice of the regulations, it must be allowed, becomes of more importance.

Those who seek innovations in Europe, are greatly to be condemned for the contempt they express for ancient laws and usages, but not less so they who are ready every moment to engage in war to preserve whatever they possess, without examining whether it is worth the contest.

When Government begins to put the West India possessions under a proper regulation, and settle their difference with America, the citizens of London must expect to be alarmed with an outcry against Ministers, by the West India ship owners. It therefore gives me pleasure to say, that in no instance in viewing the commerce of this country have I been so much surprised, as at the little comparative importance of the West India shipping*, with the total amount of the shipping of England. Of 21,700 ships, only 785 are employed in the West India trade, and in 1796, the number was only 692, and they are generally owned by those West India merchants who engross the West India trade; and if they were out of employ for two or three years it

* See Appendix, No. 3.

would not be a real grievance, for the profit they have been making is excessive.

When England went to war for Jenkins's ears*, it was in reality a small object, supposing the story had been true, for it cost above twenty millions. She went afterwards to war to preserve America†, as she called it, in order to

* In the year 1739, just before war broke out with Spain, the party that wished for war (that was the ministerial party), wishing to inflame the nation, hit upon the following expedient. A Captain of a vessel named Jenkins had been stopped and searched at sea by a Spanish Captain, who finding nothing on board sent Jenkins home. Jenkins complained of the haughty conduct of the Don, and a story was spread abroad that the Spaniard had cut off his ears. To animate the parliament and the nation Jenkins was examined at the bar of the House of Commons, his ears were covered with waxed silk close to his head, so that the corner of his wig when lifted up at the bar of the house excited strong feelings. 'What did you think,' said a member, 'Captain Jenkins, when the proud Spaniard cut off your ears.' 'Why,' replied Jenkins, 'when I found my ears were off I gave my soul to God, and left my revenge to my country?' The house was electrified in an instant, and the nation in a few days. That very night an address passed praying the king to revenge the insult by the declaration of a war with Spain. This only cost about twenty millions, or 3000*l.* a day interest ever since. A pretty price for a pair of ears, even if they had been lost!

† American War cost

	Debt	Interest.
3 per cent.	64,648,800 <i>l.</i>	1,939,440 <i>l.</i>
4	32,750,000 <i>l.</i>	1,310,000 <i>l.</i>
5	17,869,992 <i>l.</i>	893,499 <i>l.</i>
	115,267,992 <i>l.</i>	5,012,939 <i>l.</i>

Equal to about 1,300*l.* per hour ever since.

gain by trading with that country.—The duty on a few chests of tea did the business. England lost the tea and the duty, but what was best of all, she lost America, she has since then gained by her trade vastly more than before. Britain then treated America as she does the West Indies now. Yet she gained by the change, even dearly as it cost her to part with it.—Thus it appears we have sometimes seen objects over valued.—The reinstating of the French nobility to their lands, and the restoration of the house of Bourbon, were thought indispensable about seven or eight years ago.—Now they are thought impossible, yet we have not despaired, though the tenth part of the derangements which have now taken place are such as formerly would have struck us with consternation.

Having overvalued so many things, it is possible that England may overvalue the navigation laws as she executes them. Let us examine whether it is so or not.

Did England ever find an enemy cease fighting for want of what is termed contraband of war? why then make so many enemies in order to prevent contraband articles from being carried? Why be so rigid with Neutrals? Has England forgot that the rigid conduct of the Hanseatic League at sea was the chief cause of the downfall of its power?

Has not England been the first nation to flourish by freedom of commerce in the interior of

country.—The duty on
business. England lost
it was best of all, she
then gained by her

Britain then treated
Indies now. Yet she
early as it cost her to
we have sometimes
The reinstating of the
is, and the restoration
e thought indispensa-
ars ago.—Now they
we have not despair-
of the derangements
are such as for-
with consternation.

any things, it is pos-
value the navigation
Let us examine whe-

enemy cease fighting
contraband of war?
emies in order to pre-
from being carried?
rals? Has England
act of the Hanseatic
cause of the down-

the first nation to flou-
ce in the interior of

the country? Is it not well known that her
commercial prosperity is created by industry, cre-
dit and confidence, and not supported by regu-
lation or kept up by force? How can it be sup-
posed in a country, where the principles of po-
litical economy are so well understood as in Eng-
land, that it will be ruined, unless it keeps up a
rigorous police upon the ocean? I have long
thought that the Navigation Laws made for regu-
lating the commerce of England with regard
to British built and foreign ships, had been mis-
taken for the general maritime law of nations
as it is called, and that the just attachment to
the one has been the cause of setting so great a
value on the other.

If the code contended for as begun to be acted
upon about the middle of the last century is so
necessary for British prosperity, what did Britain
do before that period? It may, however, be
said, that the sea is the element of Britain, and
that if ever she gives up the sovereignty her day
is done. This requires a little consideration.
Is that sovereignty such that it may not be given
up, or at least modified, without a suspicion of
fear? Magnanimity is a word, as well as dignity,
it is of as high a sound and signification, and there
is great magnanimity in looking into such affairs
with an intention to rectify what may be found
to be wrong or impolitic.

It is always a matter of great wisdom to consider, whether an object that excites envy is worth the danger with which envy is in most cases attended. It is a mistake to think that the greatest dangers consist in making concessions. I do most readily grant, that if concessions are not made with great prudence, they are generally contrived to arise from fear; but that, so far from being a reason for never making concession, is a reason why when such a thing comes in question it ought to be considered in what manner it may be done so as to avoid the appearance of fear.

It is far more easy to render a question obscure by quoting high authorities and making a display of learning, (by giving a list of books at the bottom of a page), than it is in a short concise manner to discuss an important point; but my aim is by no means to seek that sort of reputation, and it most certainly is one of my objects to avoid rendering the subject more confused, by appealing to cases that do not apply, or to authorities which will not be acknowledged.

Great as is my respect for those persons who at an early period promulgated a code of maritime law, and highly as I think of their abilities, it is not greater than for the first persons who constructed good sailing ships. As I, however, would not copy from the model of the Great

Michael*, (which cumbered Scotland to send to sea), or from the Henry Grace de Dieu, so the laws of the Isles of Rhodes and Oleron are not precisely such as I think would regulate my conduct with other nations, were I in a situation that enabled me to treat of national interests.

The fact is, and an undeniable one it certainly is, that the times and circumstances are new, and that however great a regard we may have for what has been done by those that came before us, we must accommodate ourselves to the circumstances in which we are placed; that is always necessary to success, not that it always insures it, but without it success is impossible.

There is more danger from making concessions in a piece-meal way, than by proceeding upon, and promulgating one grand principle from which you will not recede. Give up what you think it reasonable, wise and just to yield, but no more; after that be firm, but it is in vain to attempt to stand firm on a rotten stage where the boards will moulder to dust under your feet. A declaration that you are ready to revise the law, and willing to correct it, is all that is now necessary for all parties, and it is not worth while to go to war merely because you are in a hurry to frame a code to be acted upon in time of peace. I view the probable difference between England and

* An immense vessel built in Fife upon the dry land, and afterwards with great difficulty conveyed to the sea.

America as the more serious, because I do not believe the two governments wish to go to war, and I have the same opinion about the most respectable inhabitants of both countries. I view the object which they are differing about, as that of a party wall between two houses which it is the interest and wish of both to support, but an artful bricklayer getting into the confidence of one of the inhabitants, persuades him the wall is crooked and inclines on his side, and urges him to insist upon having the wall pulled down that he may get a profit by building it up again.

America has certainly flourished very much, and she would have done so if there had not been a war in Europe, but there is no reason why if I am doing very well that I should be prevented from doing better.

I am sorry to see so much acrimony in individuals on both sides : what can be the use of all the low scurrility which the English Pamphlets contain against the President of the United States of America?—Neither should America encourage that acrimony against England, that may terminate hurtfully for both, particularly at a time when England is fighting to preserve what yet remains uninvaded of the liberties of the ancient world.

If the English writers could point out individuals in America, who were deceiving the President, (as the British Ministers are deceived) by giving him false information, by representing that

England was ruining America by taking away her ships, sailors, and commerce, then those individuals would be fair objects of attack, and all good men would wish to see them punished, particularly if they could prove that so far from being injured, her ships, sailors, and commerce were increasing in the way that the following statement will show that those of England have been.

Years.	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
1775	6,219	977,262	
1783	5,182	933,785	
1790	15,015	1,460,823	112,556
1792	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
1800	17,895	1,856,175	138,721
1802	20,060	2,078,561	152,299
1806	21,725	2,271,928	154,299

The British Navy, September 1, 1807.

Ships of the Line	50 to 54	Frigates	Sloops	Gun-brigs	Total	Men.
219	30	264	264	262	1096	130,000

COMMERCE.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Total value exported.
1775	£13,843,842 0 0	£17,420,309 0 0
1780	11,663,211 0 0	13,387,562 0 0
1790	19,130,886 5 3	20,120,121 17 2
1795	22,736,889 10 0	27,312,328 7 4
1780	30,570,605 6 4	43,152,019 5 6
1806	30,244,628 18 6	36,508,776 10 2

What a contrast the following statements, recapitulated exhibit of the beginning and end of the American war to the present !

Years.	Vessels.	Tons.
1775	6219	979,202
1789	5182	933,785

COMMERCE.

Years.	Imports.	Exports.
1775	£13,843,842 0 0	£17,420,309 0 0
1780	11,663,211 0 0	13,587,562 0 0

With respect then to two questions, those of Citizenship, and the Commerce of Colonies, I think they are clearly decided ; but as to the third, prudence and expediency must be the guide, for the acting on a principle of what may be termed equality or reciprocity, is nonsensical. As a general rule applicable in particular cases it may be very well, but before we speak of equality, or reciprocity, we must know whether circumstances make them possible. In the present instance of the Chesapeake, it is understood that the English Captain had orders to act upon a principle of equality, and to allow his ship to be searched, at the same time that he insisted upon searching the American for deserters. This was proper, undoubtedly. but where was the reciprocity ?

The English Captain knew there were some of his men in the other vessel, and he knew there were no American deserters in his; the liberty to search him might either be taken as a complimentary formality, or as an insult, for in reality it meant nothing. It brings to my mind a gentleman well known as an eccentric character, who had his pocket picked of his handkerchief in Bond-street. A passenger informed him of his loss, and pointed out the thief. The enraged gentleman ran in an instant, collared the thief, and seized his handkerchief, exclaiming—"You scoundrel. I have got your handkerchief, and you have mine, restore it to me this instant." This was an example of search for search, but then each person acted from the conviction that the other had a handkerchief.

The English and Americans were not on equal terms in the affair of the Chesapeake, to which particular affair I do not allude for any other purpose than to shew, that a code founded upon perfect equality will not do in time of war. In time of peace it is quite practicable, but it will not do with respect to neutrals in time of war, because the belligerent and the neutral are always under *unequal circumstances—they never can be on an equality.*

Much has been said to prove that a neutral has no right to derive gain or profit from the misfortune of a neighbouring state engaged in war, but in my humble opinion, this is the most shallow of

ing statements, recan-
ning and end of the

Tons.

979,262

933,785

CE.

Exports.

£17,420,300 0 0

13,387,562 0 0

uestions, those of Ci-
of Colonies, I think
as to the third, pru-
be the guide, for the
that may be termed
nsensical. As a ge-
cular cases it may be
of equality, or reci-
circumstances make
ent instance of the
that the English
upon a principle of
p to be searched, at
upon searching the
is was proper, un-
reciprocity?

all arguments. The evil of the one and advantages of the other, are circumstances not connected by any right whatever. If I break my leg, and my neighbour next door who is a surgeon is paid for setting it, he gains by my misfortune. In like manner, when one man dies or fails in trade, another, or others, get his business. 'This is natural, nay it is unavoidable; the business must be done, and justice or right have no connection with the business.

Even in the case of a colony belonging to a belligerent power, the case of a neutral trading with it must be a question to be discussed on *circumstances*, not on *general principles*, unless the principle of free trade is admitted. If the mother country cannot do the business so well herself, she must give leave to some other to do it, or some other must do it without leave. This, indeed, is nothing more than extending the principle that applies to all sorts of commerce. England supplies America with her manufactures, because she cannot supply herself, and England takes corn, cotton, &c. from America, because she cannot supply herself; thus, so far from the deficiency of one not being an advantage to another, it is, on the contrary, the very cause of all commercial intercourse.

As to the liberty of the seas, spoken of by the ruler of the French nation, it seems to be a subject that he does not well understand; for so long as

one and advantages
is not connected by
break my leg, and my
a surgeon is paid
my misfortune. In
lies or fails in trade,
business. This is natu-
the business must be
have no connection

ony belonging to a
of a neutral trading
to be discussed on
principles, unless
is admitted. If the
the business so well
to some other to do
without leave. This,
extending the prin-
of commerce. Eng-
er manufactures, be-
herself, and England
America, because she
so far from the de-
advantage to another,
y cause of all com-

as, spoken of by the
seems to be a sub-
stand; for so long as

he is at war he can have nothing to complain of. When the day comes that he is neutral and oppressed, when his ships, colonies, and commerce, become a prey to fierce belligerents, then he may have a right to speak in the tone of complaint; or, when all the world becomes peaceable, he will have a right certainly to assist in settling any general code of maritime law that may be established amongst nations.

At present those who are neutral, alone can have a right to complain for the injustice done (if it is an injustice), for seizing a neutral conveying stores to an enemy can in no case be an injustice done to that enemy, whatever it may be with respect to the neutral. To the enemy the injury may be great, but injury and injustice are not necessarily connected; as in time of war, to do an injury to an enemy, is the very essence and spirit of the contest.

CHAP. III.

Of the Mis-statements of Writers on the Subject of the Report of the West India Committee, and of those who pretend to state Facts.

WHEN men are either much interested, or their passions inflamed, exaggeration is always to be expected: and in the present case we have by no means been disappointed in that respect.

Amongst those who have been examined as to the shipping, in order to determine its increase or decrease; and those who have been examined relative to the West India trade, we find nothing but exaggeration. The misfortune is attributed to the system pursued with respect to America; but in its proper place I shall state another cause.

The West India merchants make it appear that sugar costs more than it sells for. Yes, that they do; and they are very accurate:—20s. 10d. per cwt. and 15s. bringing over make the cost. About 33s. the selling price. They have not informed us from what large and liberal purse the money comes that supplies this deficiency. We see West India merchants still living like princes; but when they come before the Parliament they have got the whining cant of beggars.—There must be some

mystery in all this; neither the iron bridges, nor any of the wild beasts at the Tower, are so curious and inexplicable as this simple fact, corroborated most solemnly by men of honour and fortune.

In the north bears live under the snow by sucking their paws; toads have lived for years shut up without light or food; and a tortoise has been known to hold a fast of an unusual length; but though natural philosophers consider such phenomena as wonderful, the bears, toads, and tortoises, are nothing to the West India merchants: the former exist on nothing, but they do not get fat. The West India merchant lives on less than nothing, and gets very fat!!

How can all this be? the thing is not credible. It is not possible. There must be a cause. Now without positively asserting what the cause is, I think I have a shrewd guess.

Amongst the chief expences of the 20s. 10d. prime cost of sugars, are loss upon bills of exchange drawn on England, enormously high prices paid for every thing supplied by the British merchants, and the interest of all the money advanced. If these items were taken off, the sugar would not cost near so much as it appears to do now.

Again, as to the second sum of 15s., a great part of that consists in commission, profit, brokerage, and expense of selling; so that, on the whole, the sugar that appears to cost 36s. did not cost in

reality above 26s.; and the West India merchant, who seems to get fat upon a loss of 3s. per cwt., is in reality getting fat on a profit of 6 or 7s. per cwt.

This calculation may not be very accurate: but the matter certainly is only to be explained in that way; and it is fit that it should be known, for at present the public is deceived.

The sugars are represented as lying on hand, to the ruin and destruction of the merchants; yet, in the West India docks there were* but 31,000 hogsheads, which, at 35s. each, makes only the sum of 675,000; a sum not equal to the fortunes of some single individuals concerned in the trade; and not more than used to be advanced in better times before the bonding system was adopted. To be able to comprehend the whole of the exaggerations in the examination of the different gentlemen concerned in the West India trade, in the Appendix will be found some specimens of it; but it is not only necessary to give a specimen, but to make some observations.

So long as the Committee of the House of Commons attends merely to a sort of routine, and repeat the same questions to different gentlemen without adverting to the new questions that may arise from their answers, the information will be to little purpose.

* At the time the report of the West India Committee was made.

It is very evident, from the precise nature of the answers given, that the minds of the informants had been made up, and that too, with a most astonishing degree of accuracy. 20s. 10d. says Mr. Andrew Wedderburn, is the first cost of 1 cwt. of sugar in Jamaica.—Indeed!! If the President of the Board of Agriculture had been asked if he, amongst the hundreds of volumes written on that subject, had pretended to calculate the first cost of a bushel of wheat, would he have pretended to state it to a penny? No, he would have said, in no particular case could it be accurately ascertained, though it may within about 2s. or 3s. a bushel, but then that would be to little purpose, for time and place make perpetual differences. That is to say, the case is different in two contiguous fields, and in the same field in two different years; and even when the crops are got in and finished, we cannot be accurate in one single instance.

Perhaps it may be said this is true; but then the sugar crops in Jamaica are more certain, the mode more regular, and the surveyors better calculators than English farmers or gentlemen. This, however, is not quite the case.

The sugar crops are the most uncertain possible Jamaica property is proverbially hazardous.—In England the produce of land may be uncertain, yet the chief expense of raising corn is quite certain. The rent of land is fixed, the wages of labour (I mean in any one instance), and

the expense of keeping horses and maintaining servants may be very nearly estimated; yet, with all this, the farmer can make no very accurate estimate.

In Jamaica every expense is uncertain: the price of provisions and of every sort of stock, the weather and the produce; yet the result was given with accuracy.

Again, would it not have been natural and necessary to know how the losing business was carried on; to know of what items this accurate calculation consisted; and to add other questions that might have arisen from those answers. Then perhaps the true state of things might have been known. As it is, I do maintain that we are misled, and that 20s. 10d. is not the cost price, but is a sort of average taken, at which planters could afford to sell for ready money on the spot, with a reasonable profit, after having paid exorbitant prices for slaves, as well as of all sorts of materials imported from Europe.

Other inconsistencies occur that should not have been looked over.

Ten per cent. is represented as a fair profit; and it is said that 10,000*l.* will be capital sufficient to grow annually 200 hogsheads of sugar, that is, at the rate of 50*l.* capital for each hogshead produced. We are informed in a pamphlet, written (it is said) by a man of great information, that the capital employed in the West India trade is 120

millions; if so, the gain must be in ordinary times 10 millions a year. Unfortunately it so happens that the whole West India produce from British islands has seldom amounted to so much.

Such contradictory statements, and such affectation of accuracy, when there is not even a fair attempt to it, are disgusting; and I point them out merely to shew how the public is deceived, and how the business is misrepresented.

Before any step is taken to relieve the West India merchants, it is to be hoped that pains will be taken to ascertain the real state of the case, and that the *ex parte* evidence of the London merchants will not be relied upon.

If true relief is intended, let it be, by allowing the planters to purchase every necessary at the cheapest market, and pay for it in such produce, without restriction, as they find the most advantageous; it is by that means, and that only, that British colonies can grow sugars equally cheap with those of other nations. But this is not the aim of the West India merchants, though they make all their complaints as if they were natural grievances, and important for the nation to remedy.

I have never been informed that Providence has not been equally bountiful in its favours to the English West India islands as to the other islands; that they are not equally well situated for commerce, and that their inhabitants are not

equally sober, honest, and industrious; then why should not their sugars be equally cheap with those of the other islands?

If I should appear to wish to be severe on the West India merchants, I shall answer, no. I have no such desire: but I have a very decided wish to be true, and to select truth from the evidence before me.

When I find two nations, for both of which I have a sincere regard, about to be involved in a very serious war, by the misrepresentations of individuals, I must speak out; nay more, when those very individuals will themselves be amongst the first sufferers, I think any thing that appears severe in my remarks will assume another aspect.

Let those gentlemen to whose statements I allude, answer my questions, explain what appears to be contradictory, and I am satisfied.

CHAP. IV.

Great increase of the Trade of England and America with the West Indies since the French Revolution—The nature of the West India Trade explained, and its consequences examined.

ONE circumstance not the least curious in the present state of things, and which more than any other is the cause of the war with which we are threatened, is, that the true causes of the situation of trade, as it relates to Britain, to America, and the West India islands, is not taken into consideration.

The last three years of the last century, and the two first of this, were those at which the trade of Britain, America, and the British West Indies was the highest; and not having since increased as it had previously done, complaints, suspicions, and mutual recrimination are the consequence.

The real state of the case, however, is, that the total British exportation trade had risen from the beginning of the French Revolution from 22 millions to 46 millions, and has been for some years diminishing: but if Britain considered this immense trade as a permanent possession she is

greatly mistaken. It is the Revolution, and the panic it occasioned, that promoted this immense trade, and as the panic wears off, and the nations on the Continent begin to trade again, this must diminish. So far as this, America is under circumstances perfectly similar to Britain.

As to the West India islands, owing to the terrible state of St. Domingo, (which alone produced more than all the other islands put together,) that has caused the increase of imports from English islands, so that the great trade which each expects to keep, and which each accuses the other about, is diminishing of itself, and the mistake consists in considering that as *permanent*, which in reality is owing in a great degree to *temporary* causes.

The ship owners, all in one voice call out loudly about the diminution of the trade, but I shall dismiss this part of the business by referring to the Appendix. The nations may all quarrel if they like to do it, but let not human blood be spilt without taking pains at least to be informed of the real state of the question, and by no means let any of the parties consider that thing to be permanent, that is only founded on one accidental concurrence of circumstances in its favour.

As the amount of the trade which America carries on in West India produce, appears to astonish many persons in Europe, and to be the envy of

not a few, I shall endeavour to explain how she carries on this vast trade, and show the result.

As so many unfair and illiberal observations have been made against her commerce, I beg to refer to a Table* which I have annexed, to shew that her vast trade is not that of a moment, or from one place, but scattered along a vast ocean of fifteen hundred miles, and consists of the produce of countries hundreds and hundreds of miles from that ocean; that her trade has risen in a regular way, and that the exports from each port along this vast country will be found to correspond with the produce of each state, its inhabitants and local advantages.

Previous to the Revolution, the exports of West India produce to France, Holland, Spain, and England, was about fourteen million five hundred thousand pounds, that of England about four millions. In consequence of the Revolution, upwards of ten millions of West India produce yearly, which belonged to France, Holland, and Spain, entirely changed its destination; and its masters, (to whom it produced a handsome income,) are now, perhaps, wanting bread, and know no more about their estates than if they never belonged to them. It is natural that we should, therefore, be anxious to know what has become of the produce, and through what channel it finds its way to market.

Some years after the Revolution we find the Imports of Great Britain from the West Indies increased from three millions to upwards of nine, and we find America exporting to Europe upwards of seven millions.

Thus England and America have nearly the whole benefit of this vast and valuable trade. What other neutrals may have had, I do not think worth considering, for it would only be as a drop in a bucket of water.

In order to account for the share which America has of this trade, it is requisite that I should first speak of the importation of British manufactures into America. In the year 1789 they amounted to two millions five hundred thousand pounds, now they amount to upwards of nine millions, and she consumes rather above six millions, and exports above two millions.

As England imported nine millions, and America exported seven millions more than their consumption, the quantity raised must be greater since the Revolution. This has certainly been the case in the English islands, so as to make the total produce equal to about sixteen millions.

In estimating the total produce of the West Indies, therefore, at sixteen millions, I suppose the English islands and settlements produce six millions.

Having endeavoured to explain what is the

amount of the produce of the Islands and settlements, it is requisite to consider what are the probable returns which America makes for her share of this trade.

I find by official documents published by parliament, that notwithstanding all the restrictions which exist between the English Islands and America, the Islands receive yearly from America, in flour, meal, Indian corn, beef, pork, fish, pine-boards, shingles, staves and timber, to an amount, which agreeable to the price they pay for them in the West Indies (as stated to the West India Committee,) exceeds one million sterling. The same Islands receive in addition provisions from England yearly, to an amount above five hundred thousand pounds. If then the English Islands, as I conceive producing six millions require 1,500,000*l.* of provisions; the Islands and settlements which produce eleven millions will require above three millions, I therefore believe that America pays for her West India produce in this way:

Provisions and articles the growth of		£.
America	- - -	3,000,000
British manufactures exported from		
America	- - -	2,000,000
Luxuries from the Continent of		
Europe which have been imported		
into America	- - -	700,000

East India goods,	300,000
Profit to America, or the difference between the articles grown, and when manufactured, the price of the goods imported and sold, &c.	1,000,000
	£.7,000,000

Supposing the exchange complete, and the West India produce delivered in America; I say that America has been fair and honourable in her transactions with England: she takes her manufactures and exchanges them for West India produce; then why, in the name of all that is equitable, should she not have an equally fair opportunity of disposing of that produce?

England is the country to which America would rather send this produce, not on account of her having been the mother country, but from convenience. A man of business would rather transact affairs either in writing or speaking with one whose language he understands, than with another: but the duties, taxes, commission, &c. are so high in English ports that they ruin every American that sends West India produce to them; this is daily proved by ships which are intended to be loaded with British manufactures, first going to Amsterdam and delivering a cargo of sugar and coffee, and then coming to England for her manufactures to carry back.

The reason why America is able to under-sell England in West India produce in foreign countries, is clearly owing to the English expences. One instance of the enormous expence which the planters have to pay, was clearly proved to the West India committee by a document handed them by Mr. Maryatt, of which the following is a copy.

FREIGHTS.

FOREIGN COLONIES.		BRITISH COLONIES.	
West Indies to United States, per cwt.	£.0 8 0	West Indies, to London, per cwt.	£.0 10 0
United States to Holland	0 4 6	London to Tonga and Holland, 45 guilders per ton, or per cwt.	0 4 0
	£.0 7 6		£.0 14 0

The American makes two voyages which taken together double the length for 7s. 6d. per cwt. for which the English charge 10s. even making an allowance for the difference of war; conceiving then that for every article that the West Indians draw from England they pay in a similar way, it is conclusive that the West India planters must be poor, and the Americans grow rich.

As it is impossible for America to send her West India produce to England, she is obliged to look out for another market, and the business is generally done as follows: A merchant in America

forms a connection with a merchant in London, who informs him of the names of his correspondents in Holland, France, Spain, Russia, Hamburg, &c. advising him that if he will make a shipment of West India produce, and send the ship to his correspondent in either place, he may, upon sending him bills of lading of the property, and orders to insure the sum, draw bills upon him for one half, or three fourths of the value, and when he supposes the ship arrived, draw for the remainder.

Although the whole amount of property sent in this way to Europe is very great, I am now speaking of West India produce only and consider the amount 7,000,000*l*.

I will in the first instance make a statement, supposing this trade was allowed without interruption.

The merchant in London having received advice of the shipment of the property, and orders to insure, does it with London underwriters.

Insurance upon 7,000,000*l*. America
to a market in Europe at a low average, of 4 guineas per cent. £.287,000

The merchant who transacts the business gets $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. 35,000

Government for policy stamps $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. 27,500

The English manufacturers sell

2,000,000 more of their goods than they would otherwise sell, upon which I calculate the nation receives 25 per cent. profit, 500,000

£.839,500

The result of this concern being closed, I estimate that America gets in the first instance by the transaction with the West Indies, 1,000,000 and 500,000 upon the European part of the transaction: that Great Britain gets 839,500. by it. Her manufacturers sell for two millions more goods than they would otherwise do. British manufacturers receive payment for 7,000,000. of the 9,000,000. imported by America from England, and America by carrying on the trade, prevents 1,200,000 innocent individuals from starving.

All the writers against the trade have been very fortunate in their plans to get possession of the produce, but none of them have the humanity to suggest any mode of supplying the productive labourers with the necessaries of life; yet this is the trade which England and America are to go to war about!!

I will now explain how this trade is, or has been carried on, to show what any man under the present regulations may expect.

merchant in London,
of his correspondents
, Russia, Hamburg,
if he will make a
produce, and send the
either place, he may,
ding of the property,
am, draw bills upon
rths of the value, and
arrived, draw for the

unt of property sent
very great, I am now
duce only and consi-

nce make a statement,
llowed without inter-

n having received ad-
property, and orders
don underwriters.

. America
a low a-

cent. £.287,000

ts the bu-

35,000

amps: per

27,500

urers sell

A supposed Transaction.

LONDON, JAN. 14, 1803.

Messrs. Well-wishers, Brothers, and Co.

Merchants, Philadelphia.

Dear Sirs,

HAVING an opportunity of knowing the result of the Cabinet Council, in which it was last night determined to rescind their last order in Council respecting Americans carrying West India produce, which order will appear in the Gazette on Saturday, as the restrictions intended are so few, I think the commerce perfectly safe.

By the last advices I had from my friends, Messrs. Vanspangel and Co. Amsterdam, as per price current annexed, I would strongly advise your immediately purchasing for thirty thousand pounds of Havannah sugar, for thirty thousand pounds of Muscovado, and for forty thousand pounds of coffee, and shipping it to my friends Messrs. Vanspangel and Co. Amsterdam, and upon receipt of your Letter, with advice for Insurance and Bills of Lading, you may draw upon me for three fourths the amount. I have so high an opinion of such a speculation, and of its answering, that if the articles are not higher than they were in your price current, 4th Jan. 1802, I will be half concerned with you in the speculation.

I am, Sir, your very humble servant,

MOSES ATTENTIVE.

P. S. You must make your purchases immediately, for after the Order in Council appears on Saturday, every person will know of it, and be sending out similar orders and advice.

LONDON, MARCH 4, 1803.

Messrs. Well-wishers, Brothers, and Co.

Merchants, Philadelphia.

Gentlemen,

I HAD the pleasure of writing you on the 14th January, 1803.

I am truly sorry to inform you that yesterday, at a Cabinet

Council, it was determined to rescind the former order in Council respecting Americans carrying West India produce, and to be more strict, they have determined to bring in all Americans with sugar and coffee. I hope this will be in time to prevent your making the shipment I pointed out to you. I am afraid we shall be ruined if you have. Waiting the event, I am,

Sir,

Your very humble servant,

MOSES ATTENTIVE.

On the 1st of April the following letter is received :

PHILADELPHIA, 7th of third Month, 1807.

Moses Attentive, London.

Respected Friend,

We yesterday received thy letter of the 14th of the first month, and we feel pleased that thy government have relaxed their unfriendly measures towards us.

Feeling confident that the sugar and coffee will answer, we have lost no time in making the purchases and hiring the following three ships :

The William Penn,	Obadiah Underdone, Master.
Father and Son,	Jesse Shatterwood.
Six Sisters,	Zachariah Anxious.

We trust we shall be able to send them all to sea this week. We inclose their bill of lading and invoice, amounting to one hundred and eight thousand pounds. There will be particular to insure immediately, William Penn, 40,000*l*.; Father and Son, 35,000*l*.; Six Sisters, 33,000*l*.

We have availed ourselves of thy permission to draw for the proportion as under; and beg to let thee know that we consider thee one half concerned.

Wishing the ships well with thy friends,

We are yours assuredly,

WELLWISHERS, BROTHERS, AND CO.

P. S. We hope thee will always bear us in mind, and let us know part of thy early information.

Bills as under:

Dated 7th of the third month, in favour of

Caleb Jones, of Liverpool,	20,000/.
Owen Thompson, Leeds,	25,000/.
Solomon Overgrown, Glasgow,	10,000/.
Jesse Wishwell, Bristol,	15,000/.
Ezekel Nogood, London,	100/.
Wm. Cruikshanks, Manchester,	100/.

Mr. Moses Attentive accordingly insures his three ships, and in about a week, gets up, goes to Lloyd's, waits with great impatience until Mr. Pompous struts in with a list of the arrivals of the morning to put on the book; and the first ship he enters is the William Penn, from Philadelphia to Amsterdam taken by a British ship, and carried into Bermuda.

Mr. Attentive scratches his head, goes home and finds the following letter:

BERMUDA, 20th March, 1803.

Mr. Moses Attentive,

Sir,

I AM sorry to inform you, that on my voyage from Philadelphia to Amsterdam, in Long. 68. Lat. 34. I fell in with the English frigate John Bull, Captain Takesall, who asked me the following questions.

"What ship is that?"

William Penn.

"Where from?"

Philadelphia.

"Where bound?"

Amsterdam.

"What have you got on board?"

Sugar and coffee.

"Did you say sugar and coffee?"

Yes.

"Back your main top-sails, receive on board a lieutenant and ten men, and bear away for Bermuda."

After a very unpleasant voyage, we arrived here yesterday,

Your obedient Servant,

OBEDIAH UNDERDONE.

N. B. Pray immediately send me a letter of credit, to prosecute my suit, for I have no money, and the Proctors will not go on without having it; tho' the judges do not sit for six months, and there are twenty-five other American ships sent in before me, whose causes come on before mine. I am sorry to say our friend, Messrs. Wellishers, Brothers and Co.'s ship *St. Tammany*, from Batavia to Philadelphia is one of the number.

The next day Mr. Attentive goes to Lloyd's and finds the *Father-and-son* captured by the *Lion* British frigate, and carried into Halifax, and the *Six Sisters* captured and carried into Cork by the *Justice* English frigate.

The bills being near due, Mr. Attentive speaks to the underwriters, who tell him, "we did not know this was *Enemy's* property that you was insuring, and we have nothing to do with it. If the property had not been *Enemy's* it would not have been captured by the English frigates, and we are surprised, Mr. Attentive, you would insure Spanish property."

to bear us in mind, and let us

ert:
in favour of
Liverpool, 20,000l.
Leeds, 25,000l.
Glasgow, 10,000l.
Bristol, 15,000l.
London, 100l.
Manchester, 100l.

Accordingly insures his
week, gets up, goes to
impatience until Mr.
list of the arrivals of
book; and the first ship
enn, from Philadelphia
British ship, and car-

s his head, goes home
ter:

AMERICA, 20th March, 1803.

m you, that on my voyage from
Long. 68. Lat. 34. I fell in
ill, Captain Takeall, who asked

All the property being locked up, Mr. Attentive fails: when the bills return to the manufacturers Mr. Thompson, and Mr. Jones, they fail; the other bill holders curse the Americans for being such rogues as to draw bills without effects, and the whole of the bills are sent back to recover of Messrs. Wellwishers, Brothers, and Co. and as the damages in America upon all bills that go back is 20 per cent, they fail also. In about two years after the judges find out this property is not enemy's, and give it up; but the law expences are so great that they take away about 15s. in the pound, so that the concern is cleared by the creditors getting a dividend of 5s.

To complete the account of the intercourse with the West Indies, I conceive it requisite to speak of the only part unexplained, and to quote a writer of a Pamphlet called *Concessions to America, &c.* who observes "an infinite delicacy affected on one side, and infinite delicacies affected on the other, in settling the quantum to be imposed; the negotiators on the part of America contending, that they could not in conscience charge more than one per cent, and the negociators on the part of Great Britain, urging them to charge two per cent." As the particulars of that negotiation have not transpired, it would require more than assertion to make me believe that either of the four gentlemen, Lord Auckland, Lord Holland, Mr. Munroe, or Mr. Pinkey, who, I consider to be men

of as high honour, as this or any country ever produced, would communicate the subject of their private interview to any man upon earth.

The regulation which I allude to is one of the causes of American ships being frequently captured. England insists that American ships shall unload their cargoes from the West Indies in *America*, before they proceed to Europe. This is so ridiculous that I will explain it.

A merchant in Philadelphia conceiving that he can make a good voyage to St. Domingo, goes and purchases perhaps 2,000 barrels of flour, 1,000 barrels of beef and pork, one thousand pound value of English goods, five hundred pounds of French wine, and five hundred pounds of India goods; freights a ship, and gives his Captain directions to go to St. Domingo, and exchange the cargo for as much sugar and coffee as he can get. Before his ship returns the merchant receives a letter from his friend in London, saying, that sugar and coffee answer very well in Amsterdam. Then it is but natural to suppose, that when the Captain returns from St. Domingo, the Philadelphia merchant should have the liberty of sending his ship off instantly to a good market, as dispatch is the life of business; but "no", says Great Britain, "you shall take that ship into dock, employ a number of hands, to unload the ship, carry all the sugar and coffee into a warehouse,

and as soon as you have done carrying it, then you may begin and bring it back again, and put it on board of ship, and then sail for the destined port."

British ministers are not supposed to be merchants, and to understand all the details, otherwise such a regulation would certainly be considered as one of the most tyrannical and foolish restrictions that ever was attempted by one nation to be imposed upon another. The Americans could only consider it as a badge of disgrace, and wonder that it had not been added that the Porters should wear the king's livery while they were carrying the sugar and coffee backwards and forwards. I am therefore disposed to attribute it to not understanding the business, for there has not yet been to my knowledge any instance, in which the British cabinet has acted either willfully wrong, or from a spirit of oppression, though I will not attempt to estimate errors arising from want of care or of proper information.

The Jews of the lower class, I believe, have a custom of throwing a piece of pork into a cask of water, and when they take it out they say it is flesh, and eat it; if the British Ministers had the power of turning the sugar and coffee into silver or gold, or increasing the quantity, the Americans would not object, but as it always comes out less, I believe they begin to calculate something as follows.

Upon every West India ship with sugar and coffee unloaded, there is a loss from breakage, pilferage, charges of unlading, and re-lading about ten per cent. and supposing the amount to be half their exportation, the amount will stand thus:— Upon 3,500,000l. at ten per cent.—350,000l. loss to the United States for the British Minister's ignorance or want of attention.

I speak of the nature of American West India trade with confidence, because I have been engaged in that trade. I have for years shipped to America goods, the manufacture of Great-Britain, to the amount of one hundred thousand pounds per year, collected from almost every manufacturing town, and have known what part of the goods was intended for the West India market, and so did the manufacturers as well as myself. That instances of deception and cover have been discovered, I have no doubt; but will any man tell me that because a few men in his Majesty's dominions do acts for which they are hanged, that the whole of his Majesty's subjects should be condemned to the same punishment.

Why Great Britain should be so particular in wishing to restrict the American West India trade appears more unaccountable, as there is no voyage, however contrary to that principle, that by paying the fees of the office in London for a licence (which costs twenty guineas) may not be obtained.

1st. The *Isabella*, Green, an American, last year got a licence to go from London to Portugal, and Buenos Ayres.

2d. The *John*, Paris, an American ship, has this year got a British licence to go from London to Portugal, and Lima.

To enumerate all the unaccountable voyages which the British Government allow, would fill more pages than I intend my Pamphlet to contain. Justice and the laws of nations are not consulted in these transactions.

As precedents are stated to be found in Gro-tius, &c. against all the voyages which neutrals undertake, I should like to know whether the following voyages were undertaken in their days, what they would have said, or what would be Sir William Scott's decision upon a voyage which I will state, and similar voyages are as notorious as shameful.

CASE.

Great Britain and Spain are at war, America is at war with Spain but at peace with England. One of the American ships of war being off Vera Cruz learns that there is an English frigate at Vera Cruz receiving thousands and thousands of dollars on board from the royal mint. The American conceiving she must be a Spanish frigate in disguise, waits for her coming out, and captures her, and finds one million of pounds on board. The captain of the English frigate protests that she is an English frigate; and shews an order from the Lords of the Admiralty, ordering her to go there for the dollars; the whole appearing so unaccountable the American captain agrees to bring the frigate to England, and let it be decided by the Admiralty court. When the cause comes on the following facts appear.

An English broker comes forward and claims it as his; but not being able to prove any connexion with the Royal Mint of Vera Cruz, or how he got the King of Spain's Order, or Royal Licence, for a British frigate, further proof is ordered, when a Hamburg broker comes forward, but he also not being able to explain the transaction, or how he got the property, more proof is still requested.

After that Monsieur Talleyrand comes forward and puts in a claim, but his claim being still worse, further proof is again ordered, when the Prince of Peace comes forward and explains the whole transaction. The King of Spain it seems wanting money to pay to France, Talleyrand had appeared to purchase dollars from him in the Royal Mint, in Vera Cruz; he had sold them to Monsieur Talleyrand at 2s. 6d. and Talleyrand had paid the Hamburg broker one per cent. and the London broker 1 per cent. Such was the transaction, but whether the British Ministers received also a per centage for the use of the English frigate, or not, he never could get Talleyrand to explain.

Question—Would the dollars be a good prize? and in what Authors, upon the Laws of Nations, is such transaction justified?

Was the Resistance English frigate last year not ordered to Vera Cruz, and did she not arrive at Portsmouth on the 26th of February, 1807, with eight hundred thousand pounds in dol-

lars?—That such voyages take place, see the following Extract from the Morning Post.

London, Feb. 28, 1807.

The Resistance frigate, Captain Adam, from the West Indies, is arrived at Portsmouth, having on board upwards of four millions of dollars, which she brought from Vera Cruz, by permission of the British and Spanish Governments, the resistance sailed from Vera Cruz on the 14th of January.

I shall make no further observation on this, but take the subject in another and more important point of view, and examine while such paltry and double transactions are going on, what is the fate attends the two nations if a rupture takes place.

CHAP. V.

Of the advantages and disadvantages to America in case of a War with England—Advantages and disadvantages to England.

THE American States have risen so rapidly, and continue to rise so fast that they must naturally, if they reflect, consider that the derangement of their present favourable situation will be at least attended with the danger that the rapidity of their career may be stopped.

America is increasing rapidly in population from the nature of things, but still it must be granted that men, capital, and commerce, have been going over to America ever since the beginning of the French Revolution, owing to its remaining in a state of peace. From the Appendix it will be seen how much the commerce has increased, according to which progress, if it were to go on, that country would have more trade than all the world besides in the space of another twenty years. This progress will certainly be interrupted by a war, which is a consideration of great importance; add to this that the peace establishment of America is so totally inadequate to a war expen-

diture, that instead of the debt diminishing annually, as it has done, it would greatly increase.

At present, the revenues, * debts, and exports of America and Britain, are on the following scale, the smallest sum being unity.

America.

Interest	1
Expenditure	14
Revenues	4
Trade exports	25
Capital debt	14

In England the case is very different.

Interest	18
Revenues	45 including Poors' Rates,
Expenditure	60
Trade (exports)	33
Capital debt	400

The situation of America will become more like to that of England: her exports will diminish; the interest, expenditure, and capital of the debt will increase. Such will be the immediate consequences of war: a great number of American ships, with the capitals of private merchants, will fall a prey to British cruizers; in fact, I consider her commerce will be destroyed; but in speaking of that commerce, although it is so amazing at present, when we examine what it would be in case of a war with England, we find

* See Appendix, No. 5.

that commerce would be very much reduced, for a great part would fall a prey to British cruizers. At present (or in time of peace) there are annually American ships carrying from England for about nine millions, from the East Indies for about two millions, from the West Indies for half a million; although America would not enjoy the benefits of that trade, she would not lose the capital, or but a small part of it; and in the same way her exports would be much less; for those ships which are employed to bring cotton, tobacco, &c. to England, produce to the West Indies, and dollars to the East, would not have an opportunity of going to sea, owing to the ports where all this trade was carried on being enemy's ports; this would prevent speculators, if they were disposed, sending their ships to sea.

I think it proper to notice one advantage which I have heard mentioned by persons in England, that America would derive from a war; the same thing has been mentioned in congress, viz. that of not paying the English debts. To show how little those persons are acquainted with circumstances in proposing so unjust a measure, the fact is that there is no time when America is carrying on her usual commerce with Europe, if a balance was drawn, but what there would be more property in England belonging to America, than is due to England from the Americans. The exports of cotton, tobacco, &c. to England and of the West India

debt diminishing and
would greatly in-

debts, and exports
in the following scale,

very different.

including Poors' Rates,

will become more
er exports will dimi-
re, and capital of the
will be the immediate
at number of Ameri-
of private merchants,
tisers; in fact, I con-
e destroyed; but in
e, although it is so
we examine what it
th England, we find
No. 5.

produce to Europe, which generally comes into the hands of English merchants, is much greater than the exports of England to America. I calculate nine millions sent to Europe, and drawn for thus; two millions at two months, two millions at six months, and five millions in fourteen months; so that if America was ever to do so unjust an act, if Great Britain retaliated by an order to prevent the merchants paying away the money in their hands, and from paying the bills accepted, there would be a gain to England.

The American navy cannot be able to protect her coast and trade for many years. The British navy alone costs four times as much as all the revenue of America, therefore the undertaking will be attended with a very uncertain success on the part of America. As to the advantages, they may be ranked under the following heads.

Conquest of Canada.

Privateers.

The free trade of the English West Indies.

Preventing the English fishing on the bank of Newfoundland.

The capture of Canada is certain, whenever the Americans please to take it. It is contrary to the nature of things that England could prevent that, but I do not think it would be an advantage to America; they have barren land enough, and, like Scotchmen, always go to the south; and there always has appeared to me a kind of attraction

generally comes into
ants, is much greater
to America. I cal-
Europe, and drawn
at two months, two
and five millions in
America was ever to
great Britain retaliated
merchants paying away
and from paying the
be a gain to England.
not be able to protect
years. The British
as much as all the
fore the undertaking
very uncertain success
As to the advantages,
the following heads.

English West Indies.
fishing on the bank
is certain, whenever
it. It is contrary to
England could prevent
could be an advantage
on land enough, and,
the south; and there
a kind of attraction

about the Spanish mines. If a war takes place, the Americans may indeed take possession of Canada, to prevent the English from having any port on the continent for ships to water at. The Canadians do not love the Americans, neither do they like the English much better, yet my mind is made up that America can take Canada when she pleases. I do not like to speak positively without having solid grounds: in consequence I applied to a gentleman on whom I could depend, who has perfectly satisfied my mind. I have annexed in the Appendix the force which three of the United States can furnish and which may be collected in one point in the State of Vermont in one month, at a distance of not more than 300 miles from Quebec. My idea was that the army could march from Vermont with as much ease to Quebec as it could from London to Liverpool, and I asked a gentleman who had travelled the road the question, and his answer was "that they could not do it quite so fast, as the road was not so good." But as three States can furnish the army I have mentioned, and there are thirteen other States that would be ready to send their proportion of men if requisite, I do not think it worth while to make another observation on the subject. Perhaps Quebec might hold out for a time, but of what use would it be if the Americans had pos-

* See Appendix, No. 6.

session of the country, except the expence to Great Britain.

It is by privateering that America will do the greatest injury to Great Britain. From the number of ships which she will have ready to fit out, I conceive it will be almost impossible to carry on any trade to the West Indies, but such as would be attended with ruin to all parties. In the American war, West India Premiums got up from 5 guineas to 23 guineas in the summer, and the underwriters were ruined. At present I do not suppose if a war breaks out that 40 guineas would pay from Jamaica. In the early part of the American war, they had not France and Spain to send their prizes to or run for safety, now if a war breaks out they know the course which the West India fleets take going out, and would run directly for France or Spain, so as to fall in with them. From the circumstance of the winds the privateer would make a passage from America to France in 20 or 25 days, that would take West India ships from forty to fifty days going the opposite course, so that the chance of taking a good many must be very great. In returning from Europe, knowing also nearly the course the trade takes, they could likewise fall in with them, but then they would not have an equal advantage, owing to the English ships having a fair wind to Europe, but still they would have a great chance of taking a

number; as large fleets are generally very long in making their voyages. If twelve guineas is a fair premium to the Leeward West Indies, thirty guineas would not be so in an American war.

When the Americans know there is a valuable fleet coming from Jamaica, or the West Indies, I conceive they would fit out twenty or thirty privateers as a joint stock, and send them to cruize after or wait for the fleet, and send one, two, or three of them to decoy the frigates, while the remainder would take a number of the ships.

Two years after the American war commenced the following statement was given in a report ordered to be made to the House of Lords, designed to satisfy the nation that England was gaining by the war, in capturing more ships from America than she captured. The amount stood thus:

The English had captured from America 904 ships.

The Americans had captured from the English 738 ships.

The number of American privateers was 173, which carried 2,556 guns, and 11,000 men; of these 34 were captured.

As Great Britain had at that time 6,200 ships, and she has at present 11,725 ships, supposing the American privateers to have only increased in the same proportion as the English ships have done; (but I calculate they would a vast deal

more in the same time) the loss of British ships would be 2,500 ships.

Not knowing how many ships America has at present, I cannot make the same calculation, but supposing it in the same proportion, the two countries will do the individuals much injury; for, although Lord North thought, that because England had captured more ships from America than she captured, England was carrying on a profitable war, I do not think any ship-owners or underwriters would agree with him.

As to the privateering system, it is that in which the Americans may probably succeed the best. It will be some diminution of the losses in trade that I have explained, but it will be inconsiderable if compared with the advantages arising from usual mercantile transactions.

What the course is which America must pursue with respect to the West Indies will require the utmost consideration to determine; for I consider her more interested in the welfare of them than Great Britain: before long they must, in the course of things, belong to America, and England will be much richer without them.

If a war should not take place, if Great Britain was at once to give up all the islands and settlements to America, and pay the English merchants what they have advanced, she would be a much richer nation than she is at present; for I con-

loss of British ships

ships America has at same calculation, but proportion, the two individuals much injury; no right, that because the ships from America would be carrying on a trade which any ship-owners would not do with him.

system; it is that in probably succeed the continuation of the losses in the end, but it will be inconceivable the advantages arising from such transactions.

in America must pursue the West Indies will require the termination; for I consider the welfare of them than the welfare of the islands; they must, in the end, be settled in the West Indies, and England must be settled in the West Indies.

place, if Great Britain the islands and settle the English merchants there would be a much advantage at present; for I con-

ceive that in the place of about 14,000,000*l.*, which America, and the West Indies, now take of her manufactures, they would take 20,000,000*l.*, and in the course of ten years 30,000,000*l.* In the course of twenty years more Great Britain could not manufacture enough. If all the ports in his Majesty's dominions were thrown open, and all extravagant duties taken off, the merchants might reduce their charges and commission, and they would have the whole exports of America and the West Indies come to their ports.

But to return to that subject which is very different, and stares us in the face, and which it grieves me to express I fear is almost certain—a war with America.—If America attempts to capture the West India Islands, and does not succeed, the negroes will most probably revolt, and, like St. Domingo, will, for a number of years, be a loss in the place of a benefit to either England or America. Although I see little to prevent America, in the first instance from taking Jamaica, which contains only about 30,000 white inhabitants, and the distance from many parts of America is less than two hundred miles, from whence troops would be embarked to prevent their succeeding, it would therefore be difficult; yet still the danger of the negroes rebelling is great, and if they were in a state of revolt, where would the advantage be to America.—As a master, if successful, America would gain nothing by a re-

volted island.—If unsuccessful, America would be an enemy; but this latter evil will be avoided if America does not attempt to take the island.—America has nothing to do but *not to let a barrel of provisions go out of her ports* for eighteen months, and the West India Islands will declare themselves independent; Great Britain cannot supply them if the war continues in Europe. 600,000 inhabitants will not starve. Of this number there are 500,000 slaves, whom no change could place in a worse situation than they are: therefore they would be glad to try the experiment of a change.

Advantages and disadvantages to England.

The disadvantages in this case greatly preponderate, therefore I shall examine them first. They may be divided as follow:

Dangers of starving the West India Islands.

of losing the West India Islands.

of losing Canada.

of suffering by privateers.

of suffering by want of corn.

of suffering by want of cotton.

of the loss to British manufacturers.

On the other side, the advantages to England, considering the present crisis, when, being shut out from the continent of Europe and all its ships, considered as belligerents, and those of America as neutrals are:

Destroying American trade with India.

Preventing Americans from becoming general carriers for all Europe.

Preventing English capital from going over to America.

Either stopping all commercial intercourse and commercial enterprise, or participating in it as heretofore. Such are the only views on the part of Britain that can in any way support the idea of an American war being beneficial.

Were I to espouse the cause of either nation, I should be deceiving both; though I know well that I may be liable to be thought by each to favour the pretensions, the views, or the prospects of the other; and however far I may be mistaken in my opinions, I feel it as a duty imposed upon me to speak freely, and I hope with impartiality.

As to the danger of starving the West India Islands, I do consider it as very great. Britain ever since the year 1793 has scarcely been able to supply its home consumption in the necessities of life; this is a fact well known from the quantities of corn it has been under the necessity of importing. From any of the European nations no supplies are to be expected; and therefore the only means of supplying the West India Islands will,

in case of war, either be from their own produce or from Canada.

Supposing Canada was to remain in the possession of Great Britain, she does not produce sufficient. As I consider the Report just published by the West India Committee as a kind of alarm bell to the nation of an American war being approaching, I have made an extract from it on the subject of Canada; and shall after that add a few observations on the subject of provisions.

Extract from the Report from the Committee on the Trade with the West India Colonies.

QUESTION TO MR. INGLES.

"In the case of the suspension of a direct intercourse with the North American States, do you conceive there would be means of obviating the inconveniences likely to result to the British colonies from the interruption of that intercourse?"

ANSWER.—"Flour and salted provisions can certainly be supplied from Great Britain and Ireland, excepting in some extraordinary cases, and from the British Colonies in North America in sufficient quantity to supply the West India Islands; fish can be supplied from Newfoundland and the Bay of Fundy."

QUESTION.

"Can you state the extent of the supply of fish

and flour which could be obtained from the British North American colonies?" "Yes, I can; there have been exported from Canada about 30,000 barrels of flour, and 80,000 bushels of wheat in one year."

"You have already stated, that, with due encouragement, the British North American colonies would be able to supply the West India colonies with lumber, provisions, and all other articles of necessity. Supposing an immediate suspension of direct intercourse with America to take place, could not all the articles above-mentioned be procured from Great Britain, or some other market, so as to supply the West India colonies, till the effect of that encouragement could operate?" "Flour, salted provisions, and fish, can be supplied from Great Britain and Ireland, and from the British colonies in North America, to any extent which may be required."

QUESTION TO MR. IDLE.

"Are not other markets, besides the West Indian markets, supplied with flour, corn, and lumber, from Canada?" "Very considerable supplies, I know, have been derived from Canada to Portugal, and I presume Spain, chiefly of wheat and Indian corn, and to this market also."

On this I must observe that Canada produces and exports 30,000 barrels of flour, and 80,000 bushels of corn; which, from circumstances that

sometimes occur in trade, is generally sent to Portugal and Spain; but the British fisheries, and other British settlements in North America consume 40,000, which they import from the United States of America; therefore, so far from Great Britain being able to calculate upon any supplies from Canada, in case of an American war, even if Canada remains in her possession, she must calculate upon supplying her British American settlements with about 10,000 barrels from home.

From 1779 to 1784 there was such a deficiency of crops in Canada, that the exportation of corn was prohibited, and they received supplies from other quarters. Such a case may occur again.

Having in two of the strongest ways possible shewn that no supply of grain can be expected from Canada: first, because it is not probable England will retain that country; and secondly, if she had it, that country does not always produce sufficient for the wants of the British settlements of North America.

I will endeavour to show what the wants of England may be if she goes to war with America.

In an Appendix to a pamphlet called

"Concessions to America." I

find it stated, that Great Britain

imported from all ports, from

1st Oct. 1800, to 1st Oct. 1804 1,491,581

By documents published by Parlia-

ment, it appears that the Eng-

generally sent to Port-
British fisheries, and
North America con-
port from the United
e, so far from Great
te upon any supplies
merican war, even if
sion, she must calcu-
ish American settle-
rrels from home.

was such a deficiency
e exportation of corn
received supplies from
e may occur again.
rongest ways possible
rain can be expected
e, it is not probable
untry; and secondly,
does not always pro-
s of the British settle-

what the wants of
to war with America.

et called
merica." I
at Britain
orts, from
Oct. 1801 1,491,582
py Parlia-
the Eng-

Quarrels.
Brought over 1,491,582
lish Islands received from Ame-
rica, in flour, corn, &c: a quan-
tity, which is stated in the An-
ti-jacobin Review yearly equal
to 300,000

The supply received from America at
Newfoundland barrels,
equal to 25,000
Total 1,816,582

Of the countries from which these supplies were
received, if she goes to war with America;
Russia, and Sweden will be the only ones that
will remain, and that she will not be at war with,
and I find a very intelligent writer on the subject
of the crops of this country, makes the following
observation.

"We have had only ten good crops," says this
writer, "in 35 years, six very unproductive, if not
calamitous seasons, viz. 1782 and 1783 in Scot-
land; 1795 and 1796 in England; and 1800 and
1801, over all the island." The remaining 19
years have been rather deficient than otherwise,
some of them very unproductive.

If Great Britain wanted that quantity, when
she had not the West Indies with 600,000 inha-

bitants to supply, what will be her situation should those supplies be cut off? my object is to prevent harm, therefore I will not continue the subject: every one will understand to what I allude, but I cannot help observing that I am surprised to see statements on the subject made public that had better be concealed.

With respect to the West India islands producing the provisions and other articles sufficient for their existence, that is entirely out of the question. They never yet could do so, and therefore their doing so now is impossible.

Under such circumstances, how is it to be expected that the West India islands are to be supplied with the necessaries of life, not to speak of those things that are required for carrying on their Plantations? I confess I see no way by which the West India islands can be supplied, or prevented from revolt, (the natural consequence of want of the means of existence), but from America.

The immediate inconvenience of the West India Planters, their loss of capital, and ruin in a commercial point of view, are not the only consequences to be apprehended; the negroes following the example of those of St. Domingo, and provoked by absolute want, they will probably will revolt, and then all future connection with those islands will be lost to Britain, together with the large capital that is there embarked.

be her situation
if my object is
not continue the
stand so what I
ing that I am sur-
subject made pub-

media islands pro-
articles sufficient
ly out of the ques-
so, and therefore
e.

how is it to be ex-
nds are to be sup-
e, not to speak of
r carrying on their
way by which the
lied, or prevented
quence of want of
n American
of the West India
and ruin in a com-
the only nation
negroes following
things, and proba-
bably will reveal
with those islands
er with the large
ade that find out










IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



Photographic Sciences Corporation

**23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503**

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1984

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1984

n
s
c
i
-
t
e

It is for Britain to appreciate this loss, it is for me only to point out its probability.

There may be persons who suppose that such an event is impossible, others may think that it is improbable, but if it should happen while Britain is engaged with all the continent of Europe, I should like to know how it could be possible to make those efforts on all sides that would become necessary?

If the ports of Canada were shut up, where could British vessels enter to refit or to obtain supplies on the American station. The whole coast of the continent of America, like that of the continent of Europe, would refuse aid to every British ship. This would be so extraordinary a situation of things, that it is not necessary for me to enter into the consequences; for if every port is shut so that neither commercial intercourse nor friendly aid can be obtained, I can neither see the probability of carrying on war to advantage, or maintaining the usual commercial relations amongst mankind.

The Americans can by land attack Canada with such numerous forces, that Britain certainly could make no effectual resistance, therefore in case of war, the event of which I speak, the separation of Canada, is one of the most probable consequences.

The other consideration of British trade suffering from privateers, is one of great importance, for not only would the Americans fit out privateers

from all their own ports, but from every port in Europe. The West India trade would then be hampered; and even such of the Americans as had an intention clandestinely to supply the Islands would find it unprofitable on account of the privateers which would swarm in every quarter, and would not cease their ravages till there was nothing more left to destroy. In this war of the extermination of fair commerce no doubt the American trade would be ruined. America has already done without foreign trade, and can do so again, which is not the case with the British empire, where the national expences are mounted so high that the taxes could not be made productive without foreign trade. It is not so in America: there the people would only have to suffer some privations in point of luxuries, and to turn to manufactures with more attention, and there would be an end of the evil. The situation of that country is not raised to any artificial height, as Britain is, and its permanent prosperity, tho' it may be interrupted, cannot be destroyed by any external circumstances. The privateering warfare would then be much more injurious to Britain than to the United States of America.

In regard to want of a supply of corn in case of war, this is only an eventual evil, depending on the seasons and crops in England; but though it is only eventual, the miseries that would ensue if England should have short crops, as it had a

few years ago, are beyond all calculation : and in the circumstances I have stated, no supply could be obtained from any country. The bare possibility of such a situation of things is itself a sufficient cause for deliberation before a war is undertaken with the only country now left from which Britain can obtain supplies.

The United States, it will be seen from the Note, in the Appendix *, supply Britain with nearly one half of the raw materials of cotton, which is now the most extensive and profitable branch of English manufactures. This will, in the event of war, be cut off from Britain ; but here I must allow that disadvantages are already so accumulated, that those that come latest cease to be felt. If England loses all her commerce she will not want much cotton as a raw material ; it is only then on the supposition that English manufactures will suffer almost total destruction from other causes that this circumstance is to be undervalued. If England should go to war with America, and be at peace with other nations, so that its trade went on, it would be found impossible, for some years at least, to find materials to supply the manufacture of cotton without the aid of the United States. This is one of the evils resulting from an American war of which the British public is the least aware ; and perhaps it is

* See Appendix, No. 8.

not sufficiently appreciated by the British minister.

In the course of the wonderful events which have taken place, few are more surprising than, that not seventeen years ago Ld. Grenville and Mr. Jay should be engaged making a treaty, in which it was stipulated by Ld. Grenville, and agreed to by Mr. Jay, *that no cotton should be imported from America*; and yet that at this time the greatest of all things to prevent a war should be—having the certainty of receipt of cotton from America. Of 61,000,000 lbs. which Great Britain consumes, she receives 31,000,000 from America, 10,000,000 from Portugal; and I do not think she can calculate upon any more than 16,000,000 lb. without America; and as the quantity she now manufactures employs about five hundred thousand persons, upwards of two hundred thousand hands must be turned out of employ unless they have cotton from America.

If this want of the raw material of cotton is an injury to British manufactures, that is little expected, that of the loss of the American market for manufactured goods is the one that is the most generally understood. The stagnation of manufactures during the American war is yet well remembered; and the extent of that market for British goods is well known; so that there is no necessity to dwell much on this danger, as it will not be denied and is already fully foreseen.

Such then are the numerous evils with which England is threatened by a war with America; let us now take a view of the advantages she may expect.

That she will nearly destroy the American trade in every quarter for a time is probable: but it will be only during hostilities; and as to captures, we may set them down at par, as a great many will be made by both nations.

The greatest, and perhaps the only real advantage that England has to expect from such a war, is that of preventing the Americans from becoming general carriers, and monopolizing all the trade of the world, by being the only Neutral nation, which it is likely to be.—This I cannot consider but as a great advantage to Britain; for certainly if America alone continues at peace, America alone will monopolise nearly all the trade of the world.

In the event of America getting all the trade, British capital would to a certainty be transferred to that country in great quantities; this is another evil that will be prevented by going to war: and it certainly also is great; but when that is said, there is nothing more to add on the subject of advantages.

The case of Britain seems only to derive palliation from the desperate circumstances in which she is involved; it is to prevent worse, not to obtain a better situation, that Britain alone can go to war

with America; and in making that attempt we have seen the dangers to which she is liable on every side; therefore, before the attempt is made, very serious reflections on the consequences are necessary.

I have referred to every part of the trade of Great Britain, to satisfy myself of the real cause of the difference with America, to see where she is injured by the Trade to America; I must say, if ever there was a nation that should be contented and happy, the inhabitants of Great Britain should be; for, after one of the most severe struggles for every thing that is dear to them, I find ships, commerce, and manufactures, flourishing and increased upon an average, since the Revolution, in a way that no man would believe, unless he examined into facts.

Having spoken freely, I wish it to be understood, that I am not influenced by party or interest, or a desire to injure any set of men: far from it: but I consider the present crisis of so much importance to the two nations, that I have been induced to examine into facts, and, as far as possible, to lend my aid, in preventing a war, the consequences of which will be so very disastrous.

CHAP. VI.

General Deductions, Observations, and Proposals, in consequence of the foregoing Inquiry.

HAVING endeavoured, to the best of my power, to show what the consequences to each nation will be from entering into war at this period, it remains for me to endeavour to take a general view, and see how the matter will stand upon the whole.

One striking feature of difference characterises the difficulties of the two nations. America will suffer: but at the worst her sufferings can be but temporary.—Britain will suffer, but the consequences will not be temporary, and perhaps will not even admit of any remedy on her part; therefore the considerations are vastly more serious and important.

There is no doubt that Britain is placed in a very disagreeable and difficult situation by being shut out nearly from the commerce of Europe, and America remaining the only Neutral nation; but it was not America that occasioned this circumstance; and if war is engaged in between the two countries, it never will be supposed on account of any real disagreement, but because it was

thought to be convenient for Britain to prevent America, as the only Neutral, from enjoying the advantages that must of a necessary consequence fall to her.

Will it be believed that Britain, with hands so full, would engage in war on so frivolous a pretext, and that in a precipitate manner? when taken at the very worst, it is a subject for negotiation, not a cause for immediate hostility. No, if Britain urges on the war, it will be considered as from some other motive than that of determining the Right of Search for Seamen, a right which, as has been shewn, cannot be supported; and if it could be supported is scarcely worth supporting at any great expence, and by no means at the expence of a war.

If Britain urges on the war, it will be concluded that she does so because it is her interest, or that she conceives it to be so. My business has therefore been to inquire into the real balance of advantages and disadvantages; and I have no hesitation in saying, that I think it fairly concluded that the disadvantages will greatly preponderate.

With regard to America, I by no means think it her interest to force on hostilities; she has already gained immensely by her neutrality, and is now on the point of gaining more than ever; it would therefore be the height of madness to stop so advantageous a career by any rash act that

might deprive her of the advantages of that neutrality.

It may be said in answer to all this, even after conceding the circumstance of the wisdom and of the risk attending a rupture, that there is a Point of Honour to be determined, that is more important than any point of interest; in so far as the character of a nation is not to be put in the balance with any difficulties she may encounter, or any advantages she may forego.—I am ready to allow this: but I am not equally ready to allow that this is one of those cases where the character of either nation must necessarily be involved. At any rate, listening to argument, and negotiating before blood is shed, can never implicate national character: which, if it is implicated, must rather be by haughty and hasty resolutions, not listening to reason, but following the dictates of passion and pride under the idea of dignity.

Britain has at this moment every thing at stake that can be dear to a nation. She cannot increase the stake, but she may increase the risk, which is the same thing; and therefore, as the play is already too deep, it is by no means wise or advisable. America is now clear of all risks and in a most flourishing way; let her not barter peace and the advantages it is accompanied with; let her not put a stop to so prosperous a career until she at least finds it unavoidable to do otherwise.

Now I have viewed the immediate or near con-

sequences of war to both countries, let us next make some inquiry into the more remote consequences both of peace and war.—Should Britain sink in the contest she now maintains with European powers, let it not be thought that that would be a matter of triumph for America; no, the world would be again plunged in despotism, and darkness would soon follow.—The age of commerce would be over, for despots do not admit of its flourishing under their hands.—Would this be any advantage to America, even if she could stand aloof from the danger? Certainly not. But again, could America stand aloof? No. Although extensive, and probably about to become one of the most powerful nations on earth, she is not yet able to cope with the Colossus of Europe.—Divisions will be excited in her councils; the East will be divided from the West; and America will remain long under the hard and distressing influence of that power which aims not at freedom; which aims not at the conquest of single kingdoms; which aims not at the conquest of Europe, but of the whole world!!

The ambition of France has mounted by degrees, as on a ladder; at one time the Rhine was a boundary; at another the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were included under the supreme dominion of France, and now the whole of Germany.—Russia is yet allowed to be termed the Empire of the East, or of the North, but that

is but a temporary measure. The means of France to destroy Russia are increasing every day, while the means of Russia to resist France are daily diminishing.—Nothing is more certain than what I have now advanced; and France will, if the career is not stopped by England, now soon swallow Russia and the whole Continent; not having any means of resisting the effects of French gold, and French intrigue becoming more active every day.

England may fall: but if it does, civilized mankind must fall; and then adieu for many centuries to civilization, liberty, and commerce.

It would therefore be the interest of America, if it could be done, to support Britain in this contest: but as that is impossible, let it at least with great care abstain from every act that may increase its own danger, by increasing the number of the enemies of Britain.

But whilst I speak this I am filled with sorrow.—There are already two parties in America.—There is a French party and a British party.—How will it be if Britain falls?

Now before I go any farther I must just remind my readers, that the aim of France is to subdue England and all the world; the aim of England is to preserve her independance, and, if possible, keep France within her bounds. The question is not then between England and France, but regards the legitimacy of the object of each

country, and that question cannot be indifferent to America, it cannot be indifferent to any honest and well thinking people.

There is no greater cause for sorrow than that two nations should be led into war by a set of interested merchants, when they might flourish so much by maintaining a good understanding; yet the case is as I have stated it to be. All facts are exaggerated if they answer the purpose, or suppressed if they do not: if any one statement is taken, it will mislead, and if all are taken, they lead to such a confusion that there is no forming an opinion at all. The data from which persons would be led to judge are,

Examination of West India Merchants,

Determination in the Prize Causes.

Pamphlets published.

The man who would form an idea of the question from the testimony of the West India merchants, would think the West Indies are irretrievably ruined, or at least that they never could send home a hogshead in a belligerent ship without great loss, yet they contend for preventing neutrals from carrying. It is impossible to understand those interested gentlemen, yet they probably have some meaning, if they knew how to explain themselves.

As to the Prize Causes, what is to be learnt from them is a sort of determination founded upon careful and accurate argument, which argument

stands upon a very curious foundation. Partly what is termed the Rule of 1756, adopted when all the Belligerents were nearly under the same circumstances with respect to colonies, a rule which fell at the end of the seven years war, and which has never since been completely acted up to, or acknowledged: in addition to this are some former decisions for precedent, and a side squint at what is supposed to be the law of nations. Out of all these has been formed what is termed a case of right, in virtue of which every honest fair trader, coming with a neutral ship from a West India Island with its produce, will be captured; but every captain who gets false papers fabricated, and throws away a great deal of money in order to deceive, will escape. No great light then will be thrown upon the subject, from the determination of the Prize Courts, nor by the evidence of the West India merchants.

Let us see whether the writers on those subjects are much better guides. If we follow some of them, such as War in Disguise, we must consider England as an ill used and ruined nation, unless the neutral trade is abolished.—We are alarmed to find a poor shoemaker the reputed owner of 150 vessels* that are all we suppose en-

* If the fact is as stated, that there is a poor Crispin who has been the owner of a number of vessels, I have no doubt his Majesty's revenues, the British manufacturers, and West India merchants, are as much indebted to him as to any subject in his

gaged in ruining England; yet still this writer does not prove that neutrals do any thing more than evade absurd regulations, so that we do not find any right to stop their trade, nor any means, though England has certainly continued to put them to very great expence, in order to give false appearances to transactions.

Another Pamphlet coming from high authority in America, argues quite the contrary in sense, and is extremely learned and scrupulously exact in quoting all that has been said by various writers on one side the question; but as what has been said by the most profound writers applies not to the present case, all the learning is of little use, if it were not that it proved that there are very complete libraries of books on such subjects in America.

Distracted and unable to determine either what is fair or what is advantageous, both parties are apt

Majesty's dominions, for the trade that kind of vessels have been engaged in, has been carrying from English ports British manufactures, sugar and coffee direct to France, and bring back corn or money by means of Bills of Lading and clearances dated Embden, which were manufactured in London, and the nature of the trade they were carrying on was as well known to the Custom House officers as where the Custom House stands. With all the elegance of the pamphlet to which I refer, I cannot help observing that in reading it I fancy I see a gentleman of the Chancery bar, with his bag and wig on Change, endeavouring to find out the secrets of the business of a Jew broker, and Moses Moss supplying his place in the Chancery Court, expatiating upon equity.

et still this writer
any thing more than
that we do not find
e, nor any means,
y continued to put
in order to give false

from high authority
ontrary in sense, and
upulously exact in
by various writers on
what has been said
a applies not to the
is of little use, if it
there are very com-
uch subjects in Ame-

determine either what
s, both parties are apt

at kind of vessels have been
English ports British manu-
France, and bring back corn
and clearances dated Embden,
, and the nature of the trade
known to the Custom House
stands. With all the elegance
cannot help observing that in
of the Chancery bar, with his
ing to find out the secrets of
Moses Moses supplying his
tating upon equity.

to follow the natural bias of their tempers, and
vote for war, rather than wade through such a
scene of contradictory evidence and assertion: it
is therefore necessary to consider the matter in a
general way, and review evidence against evi-
dence, and set off argument against argument;
the result then will be something like reason and
common sense, but as the great portion of readers
have not an opportunity of doing this themselves,
I have endeavoured to view the matter on every
side, and to lay the result before the Public,
hoping that two nations that must lose so much
by war, and gain so much by peace, will not be
rashly led to the ruinous expedient of force, by
the false or interested representations of indivi-
duals.

CHAP. VII.

Recapitulation—Further Remarks on an Examination of the Testimony of the West India Merchants, with a Plan for the better Regulation of Letters of Naturalization.

AFTER having in my Preface explained the causes of the present misunderstandings between Britain and America, it is not necessary again to repeat that, but to observe, that however great the object in discussion may be, the advantages derived to both nations from their commercial connection, are so great, that it is very desirable to avoid hostilities, and that, therefore, the discussions should be carried on with as much care and delicacy as possible. The interests of the countries should also be discussed on liberal principles, and not conducted on those interested and confined views, that lead to the sacrifice of the interest and prosperity of nations, in order to serve and gratify the avarice of individuals.

At the same time that the subject is of such a nature as to require great and enlightened views to be taken of it, such partial representations have

been made by West India merchants, and such arguments used by numerous writers on the subject, as have a direct tendency to involve the two countries in war, at a time when peace is so desirable for both: a caution to those who have the means either of preventing or approximating the evil, is therefore a most desirable thing.

This I have endeavoured to give, because I have no doubt, if a war takes place, that it will not arise from any wish of the nations to injure each other, or any wrong motives on the part of either government, but will arise from a new commerce having opened in America, difficult for Europeans to comprehend, and which the West India Merchants have at all times, in all ways, and all shapes, been endeavouring to misrepresent. Of this I have for years been sensible, but I had no design of submitting to the Public until after the West India report was sent me, and the intention appeared so glaring, I thought it a duty to endeavour to draw the attention of the Public to it; and as my statements with respect to the evidence of the West India Merchants have given great offence,* I must digress a little, in order to show that those persons who are so much offended are not in a

* When I say that they have given great offence, I mean to say, to the West India merchants.

situation to maintain what they have asserted, or to reconcile it with other existing facts.

According to the statements made by the merchants, the West India produce costs more than the price it sells for by about 20 per cent. yet many of the Planters who sustain this loss, are known to be insolvent *as to capital*, yet affluent in revenue; or at least there are numerous glaring instances of men, who have no capital, living as if they were rich on the produce of West India estates.

I do not mean to say that the profits have not greatly decreased, neither do I mean to say that they are not below what they ought to be; but I mean to assert and maintain, that the raising and importing of West India produce is still attended with gain, and that in the sums charged by Merchants as being the first expence of the produce, there is a profit comprehended sufficient to enable them still to carry on the business with advantage. The West India trade was, some time ago, one of the most gainful that can easily be conceived; but at that time the produce did not equal the consumption, most articles therefore sold at what Dr. Adam Smith terms a monopoly price. Now the case is quite different, and as the quantity produced exceeds the demand and consumption, it sells at less than the fair price; to attribute this reduction of value, however,

either to high duties, or any account of that nature, is to proceed on a wrong principle.

The British Planters raise sugar, &c. as cheap as any other Planters, but they pay more for freight and commission, and they even are charged a percentage on the duty to Government; which percentage is never deducted, even when on exportation the Government of the country gives a drawback equal to the duty.

The Government has been very attentive to the interests of the Proprietors of West India estates, and to the encouragement of their trade. Amongst other things, the bonding of their produce is a great advantage, and prevents advance of capital as formerly. This was provident, generous, and well, on the part of Government, and it might at least be expected, that the Merchant who is not now obliged to advance the duties the moment the cargo arrives, and only pays it when sold, that is to say, only gives it with one hand, to receive with the other at the same moment, might have omitted his commission; but far from doing so for this hocus-pocus operation, they, contrary to all reason and justice, receive a commission of 3 per cent. Thus it is, that the Government which is represented as oppressing the trade with high duties, has in fact been very attentive to the interests of the Planter, whilst the Merchant, who comes forward to advocate the cause

of the Planter* with Government, exacts a profit that he no longer has even the shadow of a right to enjoy.

When the Merchant was liable to receive sugars with every fleet, and to be called upon sometimes at a very short notice to pay 10,000*l.* for duties, it was no more than reasonable to allow him a commission in addition to legal interest; such a commission was then a fair remuneration for keeping money ready to make such an advance; but now he cannot be so called upon, and the legislature would act well in order to relieve the Planter, if it compelled the Merchant to abandon so unfair a claim.

I hope at all events that it will be considered, that this unfair commission of 3 per cent. on a duty of 27*s.* per cwt. is just equal to the fractional 10*d.* which Mr. Andrew Wedderburn so accurately stated, as the excess of the prime cost of the cwt. more than the pound sterling.†

* I would advise Mr. Wedderburn, and the other gentlemen who gave evidence to the committee, and who expect Government to give such relief to the Planters, to refer to the proceedings in parliament on a sugar bill introduced on 14th March 1740, particularly to the account sales of 10 *hhds.* sugar, to shew the enormous charges of the London merchants at that time, and to compare it with one of theirs, a copy they will find in my Appendix, and reflect with what a bad grace their application must appear, until they begin to grant relief themselves.

† As Mr. Wedderburn was so accurate, I wish he would explain or render intelligible to me the charge of 858*l.* a year (three

Let us just examine the result and nature of this practice of taking a commission of 3 per cent. on the duties paid to Government as it was, and as it is now.

Formerly A. B. a Merchant, received notice that a ship had arrived in port with sugars, the duties on which would amount to 9000*l.* and that to save the demurrage the cargo must be landed and the duty paid in three days.

Those sugars might, on an average, remain on hand six months, so that what with the sudden and uncertain call for the money, and the still more uncertain moment at which an advantageous sale could be made, a commission of 3 per cent. or 270*l.* for 9000*l.* so suddenly and so long advanced, was not too much.

This was the case formerly.—How is it now?

Suppose a cargo of equal value arrives, and the duties amount to 9000*l.* still A. B. has nothing to advance on that account.—He locks up the sugar in the King's warehouses, and sells it by a public

years running), for timber on an estate producing 205 hhds. of sugar. If every estate in the West Indies required the same value of timber, in proportion to its produce, it would require more than a million sterling for that article only; whereas the whole does not amount to 100,000*l.*—Perhaps Mr. Andrew Wedderburn has put an 8 figure too much, as the error is that of ten to one, unless he is very extravagant in the use of timber on his estate. 3,309,000 feet pine boards, 2,883,000 shingles, 840,000 slaves, supply all the islands for a year.

sale subject to the duty; so that he does not even count over the money. It is to him merely a nominal sum, for which he receives, however, his 870 l. as he did formerly when he made a real advance.

This, to heighten the picture of marauding generosity, is received by those very persons who tell us the Planters are already losing money by every hoghead of sugar they grow.

I have been particularly attentive to the conduct and statements of the West India Merchants, because they, above all others, exert themselves to excite war between Britain and America, by representing a continuance of peace as prejudicial to the maritime interests of this country.

It is by one of the avowed friends of him, who calculates coolly the advantage of engaging in a bloody war, in order to augment the price of sugar, that I am accused of wishing to serve two masters.—I certainly do not estimate blood and sugar in the same way as my accuser does, neither am I willing to exchange my way of reckoning for his.

This gentleman attacks me in Mr. Cobbet's Weekly Political Register, of 31st October, 1807; but he has been very unfortunate in the person to whom he applied to chastise me, for in the paper of June 1, 1805, I find Mr. Cobbet says, "the lamentable picture which the people of the West Indies give of their situation; their slaves armed; their plantations and sugar works at a stand; their property perishing; their expenses augmented to a degree never before known; their

I am called upon in very rude language, by the advocate of Mr. Andrew Wedderburn, to take the pains to comprehend his accurate statements of the expence of a West India Plantation,

towns in a state of seige; their houses in confusion; their families in a constant state of alarm; all this let them thank themselves for; let them thank the West India Merchants and Planters, who, for their own selfish purposes, have constantly supported, and are still supporting, even *now*, even under all the facts that have come to light; under all these circumstances they are supporting the Pitts and Dundases, the Canning and the Addingtons, the Jenkinson and the Castlereaghs."

"And again I say, that the savage West Indians must excuse us, the people of England, if we remain heart-whole, notwithstanding the calamities brought on them by the Pitts, and Dundases, and Canning, and Addingtons, and Hawkesburies, and Castlereaghs. One good turn deserves another. The West India Merchants and Planters have been, for twenty years past, giving their voices against us; we will do nothing *against* them, we will defend them if we can; but if we cannot help smiling at the same time, it is hoped they will excuse us, and at any rate, let their fate be what it will, they cannot expect us to go into mourning for them."

"Upon only taking this glance at the subject, does not the reader perceive the possibility of the West India Merchants changing their tone, a little while hence, and thinking Napoleon "a mighty good sort of a man!" This is the great danger. Only let Jamaica fall into the hands of Napoleon, let a free intercourse be opened with America, let other relaxations be adopted, and we shall soon see what stuff West India Merchants and Planters are made of; we shall soon see to the bottom of the souls of those, who have supported the Pitts and Dundases."

but still, as he says, my dull brain is unequal to the task.

The testimony of the Merchants, even if right, has a double bearing when well considered; for if the Planters now labour under great difficulties, how much more will they not be increased, when they have no provisions from the Continent of America?

Perhaps it is to avoid this natural question, Mr. Andrew Wedderburn gives in his statements as if the negroes on his Estate resembled angels, and lived almost without food.

The whole of the provisions for the 344 Negroes on the estate of Westmoreland averaged 89s. a head per year; of which 20 3d. was for herrings, only 8s. for fresh beef, and 5s. for grain, cheese, and porter!!

I do not mean to say, that Mr. Wedderburn's negroes were starved, for I have a better opinion of his humanity and good sense than to believe that; but I do think, that by some chance or other he has presented confused accounts.

I have little doubt, but there are articles, charged to the debit of the yearly produce, which should have been added to the value of the estate; his negroes certainly cannot eat iron, copper, and lead; therefore, if before those articles were sent, which in three years amount to 1065 l. the estate was worth a certain sum, it must have been worth

as much more, as the value of the old iron, copper, &c.

I beg leave here to thank his busy, meddling, friend, for putting it into my thick head to look over the testimony once more, for I hope to prevent a war with America from being begun on the credit of men, who tell us, that they can feed an African black on a less quantity of grain, than would be required to nourish a common pigeon*.

I declare to my shame and mortification, that I cannot comprehend such statements, and there are others of the same kind; as for instance, on the estate of Hanover for 151 negroes, the grain was valued at 25 l. & about 4s. 4d. a year for each man, being not quite one penny per week, which at the Jamaica prices of flour, would scarcely be a mouthful; nay, even if by grain was meant oats, and the whole made into *Croudy*, it would not do†.

* I would recommend those who delight in such stories, to read that part of Baron Munchausen's Travels, where he was employed to feed the Grand Seignior's bees.

† *Croudy* is a dish in Scotland made of oatmeal and Adam's wine;—Sometimes called *Croudy-Moody*—Mr. Wedderburn has only to look at the following Scots song to be satisfied that I am correct.—

What ails ye at my dad, quoth she,
My Mimmy or my Auntie,
Wi' *Croudy-Moody* they fed me,
Lang rail and ranty ranty.

What could Mr. Andrew Wedderburn mean by such a statement? Was it owing to real ignorance, carelessness, wilful misrepresentation, or was it an experiment made on the credulity of the committee?

Let Mr. Andrew Wedderburn take his choice, but let those that listen to him take care. It is not for such foolish fables that Great Britain ought to go to war with America.

Mr. Wedderburn's friend has to thank himself for my returning his compliments, by an investigation into the weight of his testimony, and taking a review of his humanity as a Planter, intelligence as a Merchant, and his authority as an organ of political information.

After viewing the statements of the Merchants, and the situation of the West Indies, I next have viewed the consequences that a war must naturally entail on the belligerent nations, and I find it to be such as ought to deter both from entering rashly into it, either upon light grounds or an hasty consideration.

My chief design, however, has been to point out the danger of being misled by those who give evidence as men of information and experience, or by men, who, appearing as patriots, proclaim aloud the dangers of the country owing to the prosperous adventures of neutrals.

I never attempted to maintain that all the differences between the two nations were imaginary;

Wedderburn mean
 it owing to real igno-
 misrepresentation, or
 on the credulity of the
 Wedderburn take his choice,
 him take care. It is
 that Great Britain
 America,
 and has to thank him-
 compliments, by an in-
 of his testimony, and
 nity as a Planter, intel-
 and his authority as an
 ion.
 nents of the Merchants,
 est Indies, I next have
 that a war must natu-
 rent nations, and I find
 deter both from entering
 ight grounds or an hasty
 ever, has been to point
 ised by those who give
 mation and experience,
 ing as patriots, proclaim
 e country owing to the
 f neutrals.
 maintain that all the dif-
 nations were imaginary;

but the greatest part of them are, and arise chiefly
 from the influence which men of contracted ideas
 of commerce have had with ministers, in cases
 where they have not understood the minutiae, or
 had the facts fairly represented to them. Obliging
 the American ships to unload their cargoes and
 load them again, before they proceed to Europe,
 I have endeavoured to shew is foolish and ri-
 diculous, and this Great Britain, I trust, will
 never go to war to defend. If there are two ways
 of obtaining the same thing—one, that will very
 much injure America, and the other that will
 not, and do equal justice to Great Britain, she
 surely will not insist upon doing that which is
 attended with an useless expence to America.

Since my Pamphlet went to the press, the pa-
 pers have attempted to give the particulars of the
 Treaty which was negotiated; but as that Treaty
 has not been officially published, and I know how
 many erroneous statements find their way into the
 public papers, I at present must conceive it a mis-
 take to state as is done in the copy published; for,
 in the account of the Treaty it is added to the part
 of carrying the cargoes into a warehouse before they
 can continue their voyage, that the owners shall
 pay 1 per cent. on the part they bring out that is
 to go to the West Indies, and a per cent. for the part
 that is to come to Europe, and that per centage is
 to be paid by the American citizens to their own
 Government. Now the very absurdity of sup-

posing, that British Ministers would attempt to interfere or dictate to the American Government how they are to raise their taxes is such, that I can only suppose the fact misrepresented. An arrangement may certainly be made that will meet every wish, by an exchange of papers at every port where an American ship arrives from the West Indies before proper persons agreed upon by both Governments.

Great Britain carries on a trade with St. Domingo by licence—why should not America? It certainly cannot be right for one country to go to war and obtain a trade she had not in time of peace, and exclude neutrals; if such a principle could be supported, it would go to induce one country to wage war with another, to exclude the remainder of the world from beneficial trades. England contends, that neutrals shall not enjoy that trade in time of war that they had not in time of peace, or supply her enemies with the produce of their colonies; and yet she is willing to carry on the same trade herself. The trade which England carries on with the Emperor of Hayti, is exactly a case in point; English ships are granted licences to go to St. Domingo,* and

* Extract from the *COURIER*, Dec. 14, 1807.

* In the Shipping List of almost every night, we see vessels of every description cleared out at the Custom-House for Hayti. Is it not rather extraordinary that such an immense

would attempt to
merican Government
axes is such, that I
misrepresented. An
be made that will
change of papers at
an ship arrives from
oper persons agreed

a trade with St. Do-
ould not America? It
or one country to go
e had not in time of
s; if such a principle
uld go to induce one
nother, to exclude the
rom beneficial trades.
utrals shall not enjoy
that they had not in
her enemies with the
and yet she is willing
e herself. The trade
with the Emperor of
a point; English ships
to St. Domingo,* and

1807, Dec. 14, 1807.

at every night, we see ves-
ut at the Custom-House for
diary that such an immense

bring home sugar, and that sugar is sold to go to
France or Holland, and the only complaint that
is heard in England against the trade is, that the
enemy will not take a sufficient quantity of sugar,
and at the same time Sir William Scott is con-
demning American cargoes going to the same
market.

The British orders in council for capturing
neutrals may be assimilated to Mr. Burke's de-
scription of the Abbe Seieyes' constitution:—

"Some of the constitutions, with the top of
the pattern at the bottom, and some with the
bottom at the top; some plain, some flowered;
some distinguished for their simplicity, others for
their complexity."

The writer of "War in Disguise," from having
access, as he acknowledges, to the Admiralty
Papers, is enabled to blaze forth to the world a
few cases of improper conduct on the part of
neutrals; but he has not had the candour to tell
us how many thousand cases he has looked over to
find them out; he does not inform the world, that

trade should have been carried on for these fifteen months,
without a single stipulation having been agreed upon.

"We understand that the project of a Treaty of Amity,
Commerce, and Alliance between England and Hayti is actu-
ally before Government; the necessity of such a treaty will
easily be felt, when it is considered, that at the end of this
year there will be at Hayti nearly 2000 British subjects, and
half a million property."

for the last ten years the number of American ships captured, and sent in by British cruisers, average about * ten a week, with cargoes valued from five to forty thousand pounds; that there are at no time less than from two to three millions of American property perishing on board American ships in British ports, waiting the decision of British Judges; the bills drawn for their cargoes are returning to America with damages, the owners ruined, and their families starving; and that one half of the money which those belonging to the British Admiralty Court receive for charges on American ships unjustly taken; would more than pay for all the cases they have ever found not correct. Those are facts which the writer

* Specimen of the captures of American ships, in one week. on Lloyd's books. See Bell's Paper of Nov. 15, 1807.

Carpenter, Capt. Meyer, Sicily to Marseilles, carried into Malta.

Juliana, Capt. Collins, ditto ditto ditto.

The Belle Air, Capt. Glen, Algiers to Messina, ditto.

The Fidelity, Capt. Dunn, Portsmouth to Trieste, ditto.

Edward, Capt. Millan, St. Domingo, detained and sent into Jamaica.

Peather, Hall, ditto ditto ditto.

Temperance, Capt. Burroughs, Philadelphia to Tormingen, detained and sent into Dartmouth.

Venelia, Capt. Barden, Savannah to Maryland, detained and sent into Halifax.

Eliza, Capt. Dodd, America, detained and sent into Portsmouth.

Kitty, Capt. Mathews, New-York, detained at Plymouth.

number of American
by British cruisers,
with cargoes valued
pounds; that there
two to three millions
ing on board Ame-
waiting the decision
drawn for their car-
a with damages, the
millies starving; and
hich those belonging
rt receive for charges
taken, would more
they have ever found
cts which the writer

American ships, in one week
er of Nov. 15, 1807.

to Marseilles, carried into

ditto ditto.

goes to Messina, ditto.

Hamouth to Trieste, ditto.

omingo, detained and sent

ditto.

Philadelphia to Torrington,

to Maryland, detained

detained and sent into Port-

York, detained at Plymouth.

does not state in his Pamphlet sent forth to en-
courage every British naval officer to send in
every neutral he meets with; knowing, that
justly or unjustly sent in, those about the Admi-
ralty Court must benefit before they are liberated.
Just as the overseers of the parishes in England
frequently expend three times as much money to
remove a pauper to his own parish, as would main-
tain the unfortunate object where he was.

Besides the ruin of thousands in America by
the indiscriminate captures made by Great Bri-
tain, there is one consequence arises from them
which I should think would be an eternal dis-
grace to Great Britain, if British Ministers were ac-
quainted with the fact, and which every man ac-
quainted with Foreign Trade knows; of this
the author of War in Disguise gives a proof in
page 234: that is, the indiscriminate breaking the
seals and leaving for public inspection every letter
found on board of American ships; a more dis-
graceful thing was never practised before by any
nation. Thus sentiments in the most sacred
manner committed to paper, are laid open to
every Proctor.

The commerce between this country and Ame-
rica is now so considerable, that there are few ships
sail from America for the North of Europe, that
the merchants in America do not prevail upon
the Captains to take a bag of letters for England,

and to give them to any fishing boat or other vessel they may meet with in the English Channel, with directions to put them into the first post-office they land at. When those ships are met with by a British ship of war, if there is any sugar or coffee on board, the ship is immediately taken possession of, all the letters seized, and indiscriminately sent up to Doctors' Commons, and every one opened—if one letter does not, the next is supposed to contain the secrets of the contraband sugar and coffee on board!

When we hear of a Messenger on the Continent being robbed, in order to get at the secrets of Government*, it is viewed as a horrid thing, but when we know similar things done daily at Doctors' Commons, we think but little of it.

I will maintain that there is no trade or commerce on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, which the Americans can engage in, or carry on, that does not more or less benefit Great Britain, and in no case is the disadvantage equal to the advantage.

* Extract from Bell's Weekly Messenger, of November 15, 1807.

"Some dispatches of a singular and highly important nature, were lately found on board an American ship (the *Caroline*), detained and brought into Plymouth by an English privateer. The *Caroline* was bound from New York to Cherburgh, and the dispatches were from the French Minister in the United States to Talleyrand. They are in the possession of Government, and are said to have communicated some circumstances of high importance."

tages. As to this, or that, being an infringement of the Navigation Laws, it is all folly, the commerce of Great Britain never flourished so much as a few years before the last peace, and then her Navigation Laws were entirely suspended. That CANT ABOUT THE NAVIGATION LAWS BEING VIOLATED began with Charles the Second's Act preventing any goods being carried to America, without being first landed in England, and has been constantly made use of since by ignorant or interested men, in opposition to fact. The total export then was *three millions*, and since the Navigation Laws have been violated and the loss of America, England has exported forty millions, and America half as much.

I have endeavoured in my observations to strike at the difference between the West India Planter and the West India Merchant; the first requires the fostering hand of Government to protect, the other requires laws to prevent oppression.

The Planters are obliged to send the produce of their labour to England to sell, but there is no law to oblige the Merchants to do the Planters justice in the sale of it, or in sending them supplies.

The quantity which the English islands produce is very great, and would be surprising, did I not know that Englishmen will do wonders, if they are encouraged.

The produce of the Island of Jamaica, at a very low rate, is worth about four million pounds sterling; I mean at prices at which hundreds would be glad to farm the whole Island, and take the articles away from the Island. Knowing this fact, I was surprised how the Planters could be poor, until I examined, and found that full one-third of their total produce that was sent to English Merchants went into the pockets of those Merchants. The fact will appear, by referring to the Appendix on Shipping, to the trial at Guildhall on 27th October 1807, of a West India House against the Dock Company. For the sum made by what they charged the Planters above what they paid rent for the warehouse, and by calculating 3 per cent. upon the duties upon the sugar imported, (230,000 hhds. at 27 per cwt.) amounted to about 120,000l. sterling: there are a few more articles, which I could add, but I have no doubt but what I have added sufficient to be pleasing to the West India Merchants.

Those gentlemen may rail, but they must rail 'the seal from off the bond,' before their statements will be attended to by the British Legislature, and they may thank themselves for my observations: I never should have made them had it not been for their indecent attack upon the American character and commerce. There is

of Jamaica, at a
 four million pounds
 each hundred would
 land, and take the
 Knowing this fact,
 ters could be poor,
 that full one-third
 as sent to English
 takers of those Mer-
 by referring to the
 the trial at Guildhall
 West India House
 For the sum made
 ters above what they
 and by calculating
 upon the sugar im-
 per cwt.) amounted
 there are a few more
 but I have no doubt
 it to be pleasing to
 l, but they must rail
 d, before their state-
 y the British Legisla-
 themselves for my ob-
 ld have made them
 recent attack upon the
 commerce. There is

an old adage, that a man who keeps a china-shop shall not throw stones at his neighbours.

There remains but one task for me to perform, that is, to endeavour to point out a way by which the questions that are agitated between Britain and America may be rendered still less important.

The question of citizenship at the end of five years, I am informed will not be ceded by America, and the giving it up can scarcely be insisted upon by Britain, when the two Acts passed in 1740, relative to foreign seamen serving on board the fleet, and to naturalizing strangers in America, are fully considered*.

Thus then the Americans but continue the law that was made while they were under the dominion of Great Britain, with no alternative as to

* The 13 George II. c. 3. and 18 George II. c. 7. the first to encourage foreign seamen to enter into the British navy, by declaring that all foreigners, who serve on board British ships, either of war, merchant ships, or privateers, for two years, shall in all respects be deemed natural born subjects.

The second, to encourage foreigners to emigrate and settle in his Majesty's colonies in America, declares that, from the first day of June, 1740, all persons born out of the allegiance of his Majesty, who shall have resided, or shall hereafter reside, for the space of seven years or more, in any of his Majesty's colonies in America, and shall not have been absent from thence above two months at any one time, and shall take the usual oaths of fidelity, shall be the same as natural born subjects.

its principle; and with only the substitution of five years in place of seven.

I would then propose, that as this right cannot well be attacked by Britain, and will not be yielded by America; that as the only grievance in this affair arises from the real or supposed granting of false papers; that on the arrival of every British subject in America, he should have a right to demand a certificate of his arrival, from the British Consul or Agent at the nearest place, and from that date the authenticity of citizenship could, at any future time, be ascertained.

While this would remove the possibility of any fraud in future, it would have the important effect of doing away all suspicion, and must be gratifying to both nations on that account.

The same rights of course would be enjoyed by an American arriving in England, and though he might seldom have occasion to use them, yet it would be essential that such rights should exist reciprocally. How far the same system might or might not be adapted with regard to preventing ships from having the trouble of loading and unloading, or having recourse to fictitious papers, I am not yet prepared to say; but I have little doubt, that with some further consideration a method may be pointed out by which that important object may be accomplished.

If my arguments are not absolutely conclusive, I hope, at least that I have brought forward suf-

ficio
revi
both
abo
be a
I
gret
add
men
any
ed;
not
fere
and
the
Me
each
one
thin
G

efficient matter to induce the British Government to revise the information it has received, and to make both nations reflect on the advantages they are about to quit, in order to settle a point that may be amicably adjusted.

I cannot conclude without most sincerely regretting, that there was not a mercantile character added by each nation, to assist in the arrangements. I make this observation without intending any reflection upon those who have been employed; for perhaps four men fitter to negotiate could not have been appointed; but there is a total difference in the character of Statesmen, Lawyers, and Merchants. There is a natural suspicion in the two former, that there is not in the latter; Merchants will always agree to take one, and one each, while two remains; and if there is an odd one, they will always agree to divide it, which I think it is unfortunate has not been done between Great Britain and America.

EXTRACT

From the Report of the WEST INDIA COMMITTEE,
Mr. A. WEDDERBURN.

I HAVE supposed an Estate, making on an average 200 hhds. of sugar, of 14 cwt. each, cannot be established at an expense of 40,000l. sterling. I compute the capital, 250 negroes, at 70l. sterl. will be 17,500; 180 head of cattle and mules, at 30l. each, 5,400l. buildings, &c. 7,000l. land 10,100l.

Particulars of the Expenses of an Estate in Westmoreland, Jamaica, delivered in by Mr. A. Wedderburn, with 344 negroes, and 233 head of cattle, for the year 1806.

Stores for England.			Jamaica Expenses.		
	l.	s. d.		l.	s. d.
Lime	8	0 0	Salaries to white people, and commission	616	0 0
Soap and Candles	15	0 0	Stock bought	708	0 0
Osanaburghs, checks and negro clothing	336	0 0	Negro labour	273	0 0
Medicine and wine for do.	39	0 0	Repairs to mill-work, &c.	549	0 0
Iron ware, copper, and lead	355	0 0	Medical attendance	86	0 0
Stationary, cordage, paint, &c.	61	0 0	Taxes	364	0 0
Hats	37	0 0	Fresh beef	130	0 0
Grain, cheese, and porter	86	0 0	Warfare	135	0 0
Fire bricks	42	0 0	Lumber for building, casks, &c.	888	0 0
Wood, hoops, and casks	90	0 0			
Herrings	259	0 0			
Charges thereon	357	0 0			
Coals and charges	303	0 0			
Salt	12	0 0			
Irish provision	92	0 0			
	2,192	0 0			

COMMITTEE, RN.

age 200 hhds. of sugar,
 te of 40,000l. sterling.
 l. will be 17,500; 180
 buildings, &c. 7,000l.

moreland, Jamaica, de-
 groes, and 233 head of

Jamaica Expenses.

	l.	s.	d.
white people,			
mission	616	0	0
tit . . .	708	0	0
ur . . .	273	0	0
mill-work, &c.	549	0	0
tendance	86	0	0
	364	0	0
	130	0	0
	135	0	0
for building,			
	888	0	0
	<u>3,749</u>	0	0

APPENDIX

